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The  Epistemological  Function 

of  the  "Thing  in  Itself"  in 

Kant's  Philosophy 


A  THESIS 

Presented  to  the  University  Faculty  of  Cornell 

University  in  Partial  Fulfillment  of  the 

Requirements  for  the  Degree  of 

Doctor   of   Philosophy, 

May,  1895 


BY 

ALBERT  ROSS  HILL 


^      The  Epistemological  Function 
of  the  "Thing  in  Itself"  in 
Kant's  Philosophy 


A  THESIS 

Presented  to  the  University  Faculty  of  Cornell 

University  in  Partial  Fulfillment  of  the 

Requirements  for  the  Degree  of 

Doctor   of   Philosophy, 

May,   1895 


BY 
ALBERT  ROSS  HILL 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


PAGES 

Introduction 5-7 

CHAPTER  I 

Kant's  Epiatemological  development  from  1755  to 

1771 8-20 

Sections 

1        Period  of  Dogmatic  rationalism  (1755) 8-9 

^  In  his  writings  between  1762  and  1766  Kant  inclines 
towards  Empiricism  but  he  never  becomes  a  strict 
Empiricist 9-12 

3        The  Inaugural  Dissertation  and  transition  to  the 

Critique  of  Pure  Reason 18-37 

CHAPTER  II 

The  function  of  the  'thing  in  itself  in  the  deter- 
mination of  th*  primary  and  secondary  qualities  of 
objects  21-47 

1  None  of  the  qualities  of  the  objects  of  experience 
belong  to  things  in  themselves 21-23 

2  To  space  and  time  there  does  not  even  correspond 
any  qualities  in  things,  but  there  must  be  at  least 
a  "power"  in  things  which  can  cause  or  produce 

in  us  the  so-called  secondary  qualities....: 23-25 

3  Further  questions  as  to  the  function  of  the  'thing 
in  'fteelf '.     Befor^  :ajtaj!  c^  these  can  be  answered 

we  itiust  show*«fr(>ni-'t2ie'.  Critique 25-27 

/•A)  :  .that*,  'thir^  jn  itse^if;  "'transcendental  object', 
'  •  ''afrKi  ''fi'Jmenbn'I  fitt  negative  sense)   are  syn- 
onymous terms 27-30 

(B)     that  the  'thing  in  itself  affects  sensibility  so 

as  to  produce  sensations  within  us 30-34 

4  Sensation  as  such  is  a  mere  chaotic  manifold  and 
consequently  is  not  responsible  for  either  the  gen- 
eral or  particular  form  of  spatial  perception 34-39 


V  The  particular  figures  in  space  are  due  to  the  ac- 
tivity of  the  a  priori  faculty  of  productive  imag- 
ination. The  'thing  in  itself  thus  only  supplies 
the  rav?  material  for  the  construction  of  spatial 
relations    39-46 

CHAPTER  III 

The  function  of  the  'thing  in  itself  in  determining 
the  employment  of  the  categories  of  the  under- 
standing. 

I  Problems  of  this  chapter  and  recapitulations  of  re- 
sults already  arrived  at  that  are  to  be  used  here....  47-49 
II  No  order  attributed  to  sensation  throughout  the 
Trancendental  Deduction  of  the  Categories.  Ex- 
planation of  apparently  conflicting  statements. 
Quotations  from  the  Dialectic  to  show^  that  Kant's 
own  view^  of  his  Method  agrees  with  our  interpre- 
tation      49-58 

III  The  Prolegomena  and  Dr.  Stirling's  interpretation 

of  Kant 58-62 

IV  Kant's  proof  of  the  Principles  or  schematized  Cat- 
egories. No  question  of  this  category  being  em- 
ployed no^v  and  another  then 62-63 


239400 


PREFA CE 

AT  the  time  of  presenting  this  thesis  to  the  Faculty  of 
Cornell  University  for  the  doctorate,  in  the  spring 
of  1895,  I  hoped  to  be  able  to  return  to  the  subject 
and  make  what  J  had  done  the  basis  for  a  more  exten- 
sive investigation.  I  was  especially  anxious  to  enquire 
into  the  functions  of  the  "thing  in  itself"  in  other  por- 
tions of  the  Critical  Philosophy.  But  the  press  of  other 
duties  has  prevented  me  from  carrying  out  this  plan 
and  the  thesis  is  now  published  in  the  form  m  which  it 
was  first  written. 

My  obligations  to  various  writers  have  been  acknow- 
ledged throughout  the  thesis  itself,  and  in  addition  I 
am  deeply  indebted  to  Professor  J.  E.  Creighton  of  Cor- 
nell University,  for  inspiration,  criticism,  and  guidance 
in  the  course  of  its  preparation.  For  the  positions 
taken,  however,  I  am  alone  responsible. 

A.  R.  H. 


The  Epistemological    Function  of  the 
**Thing  in  Itself"  in  Kant's  Philosophy 

INTRODUCTION 

To  Kant's  mind,  the  failure  of  all  previous  philoso- 
phy to  construct  a  permanent  system,  and  the  frequent 
return  of  scepticism  as  the  prevailing  attitude  of  inves- 
tigators in  that  field,  was  due  to  what  he  conceived  to 
be  a<rvain  attempt  to  establish  knowledge  on  the  as- 
sumption that  our  ideas  of  the  object  should  conform  to 
the  nature  of  the  object  itself.  He  will  proceed,  ac- 
cordingly, on  the  opposite  assumption,  viz.,  that  the 
subject  determines  the  object,  that  instead  of  our  ideas 
being  conformed  to  the  nature  of  the  object,  the  object 
of  knowledge  is  itself  determined  by  the  manner  in 
which  the  mind,  by  its  very  nature,  receives  and  works 
up  the  materials  supplied  it.^>  This  change  of  stand- 
point led  Kant  to  seek  for  the  forms  or  modes  of  per- 
ception and  judgment  which  guide  us  in  the  knowing  of 
objects.  And  since  these  forms  or  modes,  as  belonging  to 
the  nature  of  the  mind,  determine  the  manner  in  which 
we  perceive  and  know,  it  follows  as  a  matter  of  course, 
thought  Kant,  that  we  can  never  know  things  as  they 
are  in  themselves,  but  only  the  manner  in  which  they 
appear  to  us,  i.  e. ,  their  phenomena.  • 

The  vast  a  priori  machinery  employed  by  Kant  in 
his  "construction  of  the  object"  seems  to  have  so  over- 
shadowed in  his  own  mind,  as  it  has  in  the  minds  of 
his  students  and  interpreters  since,  the  question  of  the 
contribution  of  the  object  itself  (the  "thing  in  itself")  to 
that  construction  that  we  are  given  no  explicit  state- 
ments by  Kant  in  the  matter;  and,  to  my  knowledge, 
no  systematic  investigation  of  the  problem  has  been  un- 
dertaken by  any  one  of  the  host  of  writers,  small  and 
great,  who  have  professed  to  furnish  us  with  exposi- 
tions of  his  system.  Accordingly  it  does  not  seem  su- 
perfluous to  institute  an  inquiry  into  '  'the  Epistemologi- 

1  Kant's  Werke,  Vol.  III.  pp.  17  ff  (Hartenstein). 

N.  B.    All  references  to  Kant's  works  are  to  Hartenstein's  Edition. 


cal  function  of  the  'thing  in  itself  in  Kant's  philoso- 
phy," as  this  essay  aims  to  do.  Here  we  shall  not  be 
concerned  so  much  with  the  question  whether  Kant  be- 
lieved in  the  existence  of  things  in  themselves  as  with 
this  other,  how  much  or  how  little  does  the  so-called 
'thing  in  itself  contribute  to  our  knowledge  of  objects? 
If  it  should  be  found  that  it  contributes  nothing  at  all, 
that  for  knowledge  it  has  no  function,  then  it  will  be 
time  enough  to  ask,  does  the  'thing  in  itself  exist  for 
Kant?  And  if  so,  how  does  he  arrive  at  this  conclu- 
sion? 

If  we  adopt  the  terminology  of  common  sense  and 
call  the  a  priori  forms  of  Sensibility  and  the  categories 
of  the  Understanding  subjective,  we  may  say  that  this 
essay  aims  to  be  an  enquiry  into  the  objective  factors  of 
knowledge,  as  set  forth  or  implied  in  the  philosophy  of 
Kant.  It  will  have  to  deal,  then,  primarily,  with  such 
questions  as  these:— What  function  has  the  'thing  in 
itself  in  determining  the  form  of  objects  in  experience 
and  their  relations  to  one  another?  Is  there  any  char- 
acteristic in  things  which  has  .an  influence  in  the  deter- 
mination of  the  spatial  relations  of  objects?  Or  even  if 
the  mind  bring  to  objects  their  general  spatial  quality, 
what  about  the  particular  space  forms  ?  Are  these  due 
to  the  action  of  the  'thing  in  itself  upon  sensibility, 
otherwise  than  the  general  quality  of  extension  is  ?  In 
the  case  of  the  catagories,  too,  must  the  mind  be  re- 
garded as  the  sole  agent  in  their  adaptation,  or,  is  the 
cue  for  their  employment  given  in  sense?  And  further, 
as  the  only  means  of  finding  an  answer  to  the  above 
questions,  we  must  decide  whether  Kant  attributed  to 
the  'thing  in  itself  the  function  of  so  affecting  the 
senses  as  to  produce  sensations  within  us. 

These  and  similar  questions  will  be  of  primary  im- 
portance, and  others  will  be  discussed  only  in  so  far  as 
an  answer  to  them  may  serve  to  elucidate  Kanf  s 
thought  concerning  the  former,  or  the  implications  of  his 
general  theory  of  knowledge  as  bearing  on  the  main 
problem  of  the  thesis. 

The  greater  part  of  the  materials  for  the  answer 
to  our  questions  must,  of  course,  be  sought  in  the  Crit- 
ique of  Pure  Reason,  since  here  alone  do  we  find  what 
Kant  himself  would  have  been  willing  to  recognize  as 
his  system  of  Epistemology.  The  Prolegomena,  however, 
written  presumably  from  the  same  point  of  view  and  in 
fact  intended  by  Kant  himself  as  a  sort  of  popular  expo- 


sition  of  the  main  principles  of  the  Critique,  may  afford 
us  some  hints  at  least  in  our  enquiry.  And  furthermore, 
whatever  advantage  arises  from  the  historical  treat- 
ment of  a  problem  may  be  gained  from  a  glance  at 
Kant's  earlier  Epistemological  writings,  since  he  seems 
to  exemplify  in  his  own  philosophical  development  al- 
most the  whole  history  of  philosophy  in  outline.  ^  In  par- 
ticular, his  Inaugural  Dissertation  of  1770,  signalizing 
as  it  does  a  turning  point  in  Kant's  philosophizing  and 
yielding  us  for  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  his  thought 
the  explicit  distinction  between  phenomena  and  things 
in  themselves  or  noumena,  may  be  worthy  of  more  than 
a  passing  notice,  since  here  we  are  introduced  to  that 
"method"  of  enquiry  whose  full  fruitage  is  the  Critique 
of  Pure  Reason.  Accordingly,  the  first  chapter  of  this 
thesis  will  be  devoted  to  an  outline  of  the  historical  de- 
velopment of  Kant's  Epistemology  from  the  beginning 
of  his  literary  activity  till  the  time  of  the  first  publica- 
tion of  the  Critique,  with  particular  attention  to  the  In- 
augural Dissertation.  After  that  we  can  proceed  di- 
rectly to  a  discussion  of  the  main  problem  of  the  thesis. 


iWindelband-Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  Vol.  II,  p.  15.' 

7 


H 


CHAPTER  I. 

KANT'S      EPISTEMOLOGICAL     DEVELOPMENT    (1755-1781) 

Section  1.  Kant's  mental  history  is  divided,  some- 
what roughly,  by  Paulsen, ^  —and  Caird^  and  Kuno  Fisch- 
er^ make  practically  the  same  division— into  three  per- 
iods. Previous  to  1760  Kant  is  an  adherent  "though  a 
somewhat  restless  and  dissatisfied  adherent"  of  the 
Leibnitz- Wolffian  Rationalism.  Being  at  this  time  little 
interested  in  Epistemological  problems,  he  has  left  us, 
to  represent  this  period,  only  one  short  treatise  that  is 
of  importance  for  our  purpose,  the  Dissertation  by 
which  he  qualified  for  teaching  in  llb^—' ' Principiorum 
Primorum  Cognitionis  Metaphysicae  Nova  Dilucidatio" . 
In  this  he  defends  that  Rationalism  whose  chief  Episte- 
mological dogma  may  be  said  in  general  to  be  that  Rea- 
son is  capable  in  her  own  strength  of  revealiyig  the  nature 
of  things.  He  shares  with  it  too  the  general  confusion  as 
revealed  by  all  the  German  philosophers  from  Leibnitz 
to  Kant,^  concerning  the  relation  of  the  two  principles 
which  they  attribute  to  the  use  of  reason— that  of  con- 
tradiction and  that  of  sufficient  ground  or  reason.  ^  On 
the  one  side  he  sets  up  the  former  as  the  highest  prin- 
ciple of  all  truth,  ^  and  attempts  to  demonstrate  the 
validity  of  the  latter,  thus  identifying  it  in  a  last  resort 
with  the  principle  of  contradiction.'^  This  would  leave 
Kant  a  consistent  rationalist  like  Spinoza:  the  ground  of 
knowledge  would  be  identical  with  the  cause  in  things.^ 
On  the  other  hand,  Kant  denies  outright  the  identity  of 
cause  and  ground,^  and  treats  the  principle  of  sufficient 
reason  as  at  least  partially  independent  of  that  of  con- 
tradiction. ^^  The  same  might  thus  be  said  of  Kant  at 
this  stage  in  his  development  as  has  been  said  of  Wolff 
to  v/nose  school  he  now  belongs,  viz. ,  that  in  reality  he 
has  no  theory  of  knowledge  at  all.  ^^  So  much,  however, 
the  attempted  defense  of  Rationalism  in  this  essay  has 

'  Versuch  ein  Eutwichlungsgeschichte  d.  K.  Erkenntniss  theorie,  p.  1-4. 

2  Caird's  Critical  Philosophy  of  Kant.  Vol.  I,  pp.  65-67. 

3  Kuno  Fischer— Gesch.  d.  neueren  Phil.  Vol.  Ill,  p.  ? 

*  Zeller,  Gesch.  d.  Phil,  in  Deutschland  seit  Leibnitz,  pp.  147  ff. 

^  Paulsen's  Versuch  etc.,  p.  34. 

6  Kant's  Werke  I,  p.  377. 

'  Werke  I,  p.  374. 

^  Paulsen's  Versuch  etc.,  p.  34. 

8  Werke  I,  pp.  377  ff. 
'  o  Caird,  Grit.  Phil.  I.  pp.  186  ff. 
'  1  Zeller,  Gesch.  d.  Phil.  p.  218. 


done  for  Kant:  it  has  brought  him  face  to  face  with  the 
problem  concerning  the  connection  of  thought  and  real- 
ity. On  reflection  upon  this  problem  and  the  implica- 
tions of  his  inherited  Rationalism  in  regard  to  it,  he 
seems  to  have  been  led  to  see  the  inadequacy  of  his  first 
answer  and  the  vascillating  attitude  of  his  school. 

Section  II.  The  principle  of  Sufficient  Reason 
proved  to  be  the  stimulating  block  for  Kant.^  Setting 
out  from  a  criticism  of  this  principle,  we  find  him  in 
his  writings  between  1762  and  1766  gradually  develop- 
ing in  the  direction  of  Empiricism,  at  least  so  far  as 
that  doctrine  is  negative,  denying  the  possibility  of  ar- 
riving at  a  knowledge  of  things  by  means  of  pure  reason. 
This  is  Kant's  attitude  during  the  second  period  of  his 
mental  development.^  It  is  represented  by  four  treat- 
ises written  during  the  years  1762-3,  viz:  "The  False 
Subtilty  of  the  Four  Syllogistic  Figures,"  "The  Sole 
Ground  for  the  Demonstration  of  the  Being  of  God," 
an  essay  ' '  On  the  Evidence  of  the  Principles  of  Nat- 
ural Theology  and  Morals, ' '  and  '  'An  Attempt  to  Intro- 
duce the  Conception  of  Negative  Quantity  into  Philoso- 
phy. "^  To  these  should  also  be  added  "Dreams  of  a 
Ghost-Seer  as  illustrated  by  the  Dreams  of  Metaphys- 
ic"  published  three  years  later. 

At  the  end  of  this  period  we  find  Kant  practically 
declaring  war  against  that  Rationalism  from  which  he  had 
himself  set  out.  And  yet  '  'the  despairing  renunciation 
of  Rationalism  which  shows  itself  in  the  'Dreams'  is 
only  the  final  result  of  a  course  of  investigation  which 
is  already  begun  in  the  'Dilucidatio  Nova';  and  the  in- 
tervening treatises  enable  us  to  connect  the  latter  with 
the  former  almost  without  a  break.  "^  In  the  first  of 
these  treatises  Kant  points  out  that  the  movement  of 
thought  is  purely  analytic,  proceeding  according 
to  the  principle  of  Contradiction.^  And  in  the  second, 
he  goes  on  to  enforce  that  lesson  and  its  consequences 
for  the  prevailing  Rationalism  by  contending  that  it  is 
impossible  by  means  of  this  principle  alone  to  bridge 
the  gulf  between  thought  and  reality.^ 

Following  upon  this  is  a  criticism,  in  the  prize  essay 

1  Paulsen's  Versuch  etc.,  pp.  1  and  37  ff. 

2  Caird,  Crit.  Phil,  of  Kant,  Vol.  I,  pp.  116-160;  cf.  also  Paulsen's  Versuch,  etc., 
pp.  2  and  37-100. 

3  That  the  above  is  the  order  in  which  these  treatises  were  written  has  heen 
established  by  Benno  Erdmann,  Reflexionen  Kant's,  Introduction  to  Vol.  II,  pp.  17  ff. 

*  Caird,  Crit.  Phil.  Vol.  I,  p.  117. 

5  Werke  II,  p.  57. 

6  Werke  II,  pp.  115-117. 


'  'On  the  Evidence  of  the  Principles  of  Natural  Theology 
and  Morals,"  of  the  method  employed  by  his  predeces- 
sors of  the  Eighteenth  Century.  They,  inspired  by 
the  great  success  of  mathematical  science,  had  been 
led  to  suppose  that  the  same  method  might  be  employed 
to  advantage  in  Metaphysics,  and  the  result  of  their  at- 
tempt had  been  fatal  to  the  interests  of  philosophy.  ^ 
The  business  of  philosophy,  Kant  thinks,  is  to  analyse 
and  make  clear  given  conceptions,  while  that  of  mathe- 
matics is,  by  means  of  arbitrary  syntheses,  to  produce 
conceptions  that  are  not  given.  Hence,  the  method  of 
the  latter  cannot  be  applied  in  the  investigations  of  the 
former.  And  in  connexion  with  these  conclusions  con- 
cerning the  method  of  philosophy,  Kant  claims  that, 
while  she  has  only  one  formal  principle,  viz.,  that  of 
contradiction,  there  must  be  many  material  principles 
of  knowledge.^  There  must  be  a  large  number  of  fun- 
damental, though  often  obscure  conceptions,  to  the 
analysis  of  which  philosophy  is  called. 

In  the  fourth  treatise  of  the  year  1763,  the  Episte- 
mological  results  of  the  preceding  three  are  more  clearly 
asserted  and  Kant's  break  with  the  old  Rationalism  is 
no  longer  half-hearted  but  decided  and  clear.  He  has 
already  told  us  that  the  movement  of  pure  thought  is 
solely  analytic,  that  demonstration  guided  by  the  law  of 
identity  or  contradiction  can  only  analyze  what  is  given, 
and  rnust  therefore  start  with  many  indemonstrable 
principles;  and  that,  accordingly,  pure  thought  or  rea- 
son is  unable  in  its  own  strength  to  get  beyond  itself 
and  make  connection  with  objective  reality.  And  now, 
inthe  treatise  under  discussion,  he  not  only  enforces 
still  more  clearly  the  above  lessons  but  also  goes  beyond 
them  by  telling  us  in  effect  that,  while  the  movem.ent 
of  pure  thought  is  analytic,  that  of  knowledge  is  sym- 
pathetic. ^  Kant  holds  consistently  now  to  the  distinct- 
ion between  logical  ground  and  cause  in  things.  And 
since  the  identity  of  these  was,  more  or  less  clearly, 
the  presupposition  of  all  previous  Rationalism,  he  may 
surely  be  said  to  have  ceased  to  be  a  Rationalist.  Is  he 
then,  at  this  stage  in  his  development  an  Empiricist? 

Kant  does  not  give  us  a  positive  answer  to  this 
question  in  the  treatise  concerning  "Negative  Quality" ; 


1  Werke  11,  pp.  291  ff.  Cf.  also  Werke  III.  pp.  15  ff. 

2  Werke  II.  p.  303. 

3  Werke  II.  pp.  103-106.  Cf.  also  Caird,  Critical  Philosophy  of  Kant.  Vol.  I.  pp. 
128  11;  and  Paulsen's  Versuch  etc.,  pp.  38  ff. 

10  ' 


but  one  might  suppose  that  when  he  denies  the  ability 
of  reason  to  give  us  knowledge  of  facts,  he  must  either 
conceive  a  third  possibility  or  attribute  that  pov/er  to 
experience.  At  all  events,  this  latter  is  his  answer  in 
the  "Dreams"  published  three  years  later,  with  which 
may  be  compared  a  letter  to  Mendelsohn  on  April  8th 
of  the  same  year  (1766).^  In  the  "Dreams"  he  says: 
'  'The  fundamental  conceptions  of  things  as  causes  and  of 
their  forces  and  actions  are  quite  arbitrary  when  not 
taken  from  experience,  and  apart  from  experience  we 
can  never  prove  nor  disprove  them"^  Again  in  the  let- 
ter just  mentioned  Kant  asks:  '4s  it  possible  by  rea- 
son to  discover  a  primitive  force,  i.  e.  the  first  funda- 
mental relation  of  a  cause  and. an  effect?  I  answer  with 
certainty  that  it  is  impossible.'  Hence,  I  am  reduced  to 
the  conclusion  that  except  in  so  far  as  such  forces  are 
given  in  experience  they  are  only  fictions  of  imagina- 
tion. "^ 

And  yet  there  is  a  great  difference  between  Kant's 
frame  of  mind  at  this  time  and  the  attitude  of  Hume 
toward  the  problem  of  causality.  Both  Kant  and  Hume 
appeal  to  experience  as  the  sole  source  of  all  knowl- 
edge of  '  'matters  of  fact, ' '  but  they  understand  exper- 
ience quite  differently.  For  Hume  experience  is  made 
up  of  a  vast  number  of  isolated  and  particular  impres- 
sions and  ideas.  Each  of  these  constituents  exists  in 
its  own  right  and  is  received  into  the  mind  in  its  own 
particularity.  But  from  what  has  been  quoted  from 
Kant  it  v/ill  be  seen  that  his  view  is  a  quite  dif- 
ferent one.  Experience  yields  for  him  not  only  im- 
pressions but  also  their  arrangement.  The  connexion 
of  cause  and  effect  is  mentioned  by  him  as  one  of  the 
facts  learned  from  experience,  the  very  connexion 
which  Hume  declared  could  not  be  derived  from  any  im- 
pression. So  that  we  may  state  the  difference  between 
Kant  at  this  time  and  the  great  Empiricist,  as  follows: 
Kant  holds  that,  except  in  so  far  as  the  relation  of  cause 
and  effect  is  given  in  experience,  it  is  only  a  fiction  of 
the  imagination.  Hume  said  the  same.  It  still  remain- 
ed for  Kant  to  go  a  step  further  and  say  with  Hume: 
such  a  relation  cannot  be  given  in  experience  and  there- 
fore it  is  a  fiction  of  the  imagination.     Now  it  was  just 


1  Werke  VIII,  pp.  672  ff. 

2  Werke  II,  p.  378  cf.  Paulsen's  Versuch,  etc.,  p.  44;  and  Caird's  Critical  Phil- 
osophy of  Kant,  Vol.  I,  p.  154. 

3  Werke  VIII,  p.  674. 

11 


this  step  v/hich  Kant,  though  perhaps  unwittingly,  re- 
fused to  take.  It  would  seem  as  if  at  the  time  of  writ- 
ing the  "Dreams,"  this  atomistic  view  of  sensations 
had  never  occurred  to  Kant.  He  looks  upon  experience 
quite  naively  and  proclaims  that  all  knowledge  of  forces 
and  their  actions  must  be  derived  from  experience  if  it 
is  to  be  worth  anything. 

It  seems  highly  probable  that  the  most  powerful 
influence  of  Hume  upon  our  philosopher  must  be 
ascribed  to  the  time  immediately  following  the  publica- 
tion of  the  "Dreams."^  Though  he  has  been  acquainted 
with  English  Empiricism  and  no  doubt  with  Hume  him- 
self for  some  time,  yet  now  he  is  first  awakened  from 
his  '  'dogmatic  slumber' '  by  discovering  in  the  scepticism 
of  Hume  the  necessary  consequences  of  his  own  appeal 
to  experience  in  opposition  to  the  Rationalism  under 
which  he  had  been  educated.  Kant  has  only  to  see 
that  experience,  in  the  sense  of  sensations,  can  never 
give  us  apodictically  certain  and  universally  valid  prop- 
ositions in  order  to  reject  it  as  the  sole  means  of  gaining 
a  knowledge  of  things 

But  the  possibility  of  such  knowledge  will  not  be 
given  up  by  Kant  v/ithout  a  struggle.  He  has  demon- 
strated the  inadequacy  of  the  old  dogmsitic  Ratio7ialism', 
the  sceptical  results  of  Hume's  investigation  have  taught 
him  that  in  perception  his  ideal  of  knowledge  cannot 
be  realized;  but  nothing  daunted  Kant  applies  himself 
to  a  new  explanation  of  how  we  may  arrive  at  a  knowl- 
edge of  things.  With  this  explanation  we  enter  upon 
the  third  period  in  the  development  of  Kant's  thought, 
w^hich  opens  with  the  publication  of  his  Inaugural  Dis- 
sertation in  1770,  and  ends  for  Epistemology,  with  the 
second  edition  of  the  Critique  of  Pure   Reason   in  1787. 

Section  3.  In  the  Dissertation  we  meet  for  the 
first  time  in  the  history   of   Kant's  thought,    with  the 

1  Kuno  Fischer  (Gesch.  d.  u.  Phil.  HI,  pp.  178  and  254)  and  also  Zeller  (Gesch. 
d.  deut.  Phil,  etc.,  p.  417^  are  inclined  to  place  the  infiuence  of  Hume  as  early  as  176S. 
But  while  he  undoubtedly  knew  something  of  Hume  at  that  time,  it  seems  cer- 
tain, as  they  admit,  that  Hume's  doubts  had  not  yet  taken  much  hold  upon  him. 
(With  this  compare  Paulsen's  Versuch,  etc.,  p.  100  and  a  few  passages  preceding). 
On  the  other  hand,  Caird  (Grit.  Phil,  of  Kant  I,  pp.  201  ff )  following  Benno  Erdmann 
(in  an  article  in  Archiv  f.  Gesch.  d.  Phil.),  finds  that  the  awakening  of  which  Kant 
himself  speaks  occurs  after  the  publication  of  the  Dissertation.  Caird  quotes  from 
Kant  to  prove  that  it  was  in  the  universalization  of  Hume's  problem  that  he  first 
found  light  and  that  universalization  first  took  place  in  the  Critique.  In  the  same 
Quotation,  however,  Kant  says  that  he  had  already  assured  himself  that  these  prin- 
ciples e.  g.  causality  come  not  from  experience  but  from  the  mind  itself,  and  this  he 
knew  when  he  wrote  the  Dissertation,  as  we  shall  see.  It  seems  probable,  then,  that 
Hume's  influence  began  to  be  felt  at  the  time  and  in  the  way  we  have  suggested, 
that  not  till  afterwards,  however,  was  its  full  significance  realized  and  Kant  driven 
to  go  beyond  the  Dissertation  to  the  Critique. 

12 


distinction  between  phenomena  and  noumena,  and  in- 
deed in  the  same  form  in  which  it  is  found  in  Plato  and 
other  ancient  writers,  as  Kant  himself  remarks.  Like 
them,  Kant  bases  that  distinction  upon  the  difference 
in  the  organs  by  means  of  which  they  are  known.  The 
senses  give  us  things  only  as  they  appear  to  us  or  p/ie- 
nomena,  ^the  understanding  things  as  they  are  or  7iou- 


mena 


Leibnitz  had  made  somewhat  the  same  distinction 
between  Sensibility  and  Understanding,  ^  but  claimed 
for  the  former  the  ability  to  arrive  at  an  obscure  knowl- 
edge of  things.  Kant,  however,  makes  the  distinction 
absolute  and  opposes  in  strong  terms  the  position  held 
by  Leibnitz.  3  For  Kant  sensibility  is  passive,  the  un- 
derstanding active;  the  former  receptive,  the  latter 
spontaneous.^ 

If  now  we  inquire  for  the  motive  which  led  Kant 
to  recast  this  distinction  of  Leibnitz  before  adopting  it 
as  the  foundation  of  his  own  system,  we  find,  I  think, 
that  it  is  akin  to  that  which  led  him  to  reject  his  own 
empiricism,  or,  rather,  v/hich  prevented  him  from  ever 
actually  becoming  an  empiricist.  Reflexion  upon  what 
is  implied  in  empiricism  shows  that  it  must  doubt  the 
applicability  of  mathematics  to  the  objects  of  experi- 
ence,^ a  doubt  which  Kant  seems  to  have  been  never 
able  to  entertain.  And  on  the  other  hand,  since  math- 
ematics is  sensuous  knowledge  it  affords  an  argument 
against  the  view  of  Leibnitz  that  all  sensuous  knowl- 
edge is  obscure;  for  mathematics  was  to  the  whole 
eighteenth  century  the  type  of  clear  demonstration. 
So  if  Kant  is  to  adopt  this  distinction  of  Leibnitz,  there 
remains  no  alternative  but  to  transform  it  and  make  it 
absolute.^  Thus  results  his  theory  of  the  receptivity  of 
sense  and  the  spontaneity  of  thought  as  fundamental  to 
his  system,  both  as  enunciated  in  the  Dissertation  and 
as  remodeled  and  further  developed  in  the  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason.'' 

Having  noted  then  the  point  of  most  importance  for 
us  in  this  treatise  of  Kant,  viz. ,  the  absolute  distinction 

1  Werke  II,  p.  400  (sections  3  and  4  of  Dissertation) . 

2  Nouveaux  Essais  Book  IV,  chapter  3. 

3  Werke  II,  pp.  400-402. 

*  Werke  III,  pp.  52  and  82. 
_  5  I  do  not  mean  that  it  is  on  this  point  alone  that  Kant  objects  to  the  results  of 
empiricism,  but  for  the  present  purpose  it  seems  of  most  importance.     See  Werke 
IV,  p.  20,  and  Paulsen's  Versuch,  etc.,  pp.  132,  136,  and  141. 

^  cf.Windleband,  Gesch.  d.  Phil. Vol.  II,  p.  32;  also  an  article  in  Vierteljahrschrift, 
Vol.  I,  p.  239,  "Verschiedene  Phasen  d.  Kant'schen  Lehre  vom  Ding  an  Sich." 

7  cf.  Caird,  Grit.  Phil.  VoL  I,  p.  171  and  Paulsen's  Versuch,  etc.,  p.  115. 

13 


between  sense  and  thought,  and  the  revival  in  connec- 
tion with  that  of  the  old  Platonic  division  of  all  objects 
into  phenomena  and  noumena,  let  us  now  go  on  to  en- 
quire more  fully  into  Kant's  theory  of  knowledge  in  re- 
gard to  each  of  these  classes  of  objects. 

In  the  case  of  sensuous  knowledge  we  must  distin- 
guish the  matter  from  the  form^  The  former  is  given 
in  the  sensation,  which  is  due  to  the  action  of  an  object 
upon  the  sensibility.  The  latter,  on  the  other  hand,  is 
due  to  the  activity  of  the  mind,  according  to  whose  laws 
the  raw  material  of  sensations  is  formed  into  orderly 
perceptions.  The  laws  or  forms  to  which  all  perception 
must  conform  are  Space  and  Time,^  which  are  thus  not 
qualities  of  things  in  themselves  but  only  forms  of  per- 
ception under  which  all  things  must  appear  to  us. 

In  anticipation  we  may  here  add  that  the  intellect 
has  also  a  function  to  perform  in  relation  to  these  per- 
ceptions. By  the  logical  use  of  the  understanding  they 
are  subordinated  to  conceptions,  which  conceptions  are 
themselves  often  won  by  a  process  of  abstraction  from 
perceptions,  and  thus  the  whole  of  experience  is 
formed.^ 

What  is  of  particular  interest  to  us  here,  however, 
is  the  doctrine  that  space  and  time  are  not  qualities  of 
things,  but  forms  which  the  mind  brings  to  perceptions. 
They  are  not  abstracted  from  experience  as  presenting 
to  us  objects  in  space  and  time,  but  through  them  our 
spatial  and  temporal  experience  is  rendered  possible.  If 
such  forms  were  not  contributed  by  the  mind,  the  per- 
ception of  objects  as  beside  one  another  in  space  and  af- 
ter one  another  in  time,  would  not  be  possible.^ 

It  would  seem,  then,  that  the  object  has  no  func- 
tion here  in  the  determination  of  those  qualities  which 
Locke  designated  as  primary,  though  Kant  himself  does 
not  seem  to  have  ever  raised  the  question  whether  any 
quality  exists  in  the  thing  in  virtue  of  which  its  action 
upon  our  sensibility  leads  us  to  perceive  it  not  only  as  in 
space,  but  also  endowed  with  a  shape  peculiar  to  itself. 
Doubtless  the  question  never  entered  into  Kant's  mind, 
after  having  once  decided  that  all  form  comes  from  the 
mind,  and  why  should  it?  Nor  does  Kant  give  any  ex- 
plicit answer  to  this  question  in  the  Critique,  though,  I 


1  Werke  II,  p.  400. 

^  Werke  11,  p.  405  (section  13  of  Dissertation). 

3  Werke  II,  p.  401  (section  5,  end). 

*  Werke  II,  pp.  406-413  (sections  14  and  15  of  Dissertation). 

14 


think,  we  shall  find  that  the  implications  of  his  theory 
are  quite  unmistakable.     But  of  this  again. 

We  must  further  ask,  does  Kant  mean  to  imply,  in 
his  theory  that  sensation  gives  us  the  unformed  matter 
of  perception,  that  sensation  reveals  to  us  the  true  qual- 
ities of  the  object?  In  other  words,  is  Kant's  theory  of 
the  phenomenal  nature  of  sensuous  knowledge  a  conclu- 
sion from  the  apriority  of  space  and  time?  If  it  is, 
then  the  former  question  must  be  answered  in  the 
affirmative;  since  we  should  only  have  to  abstract  from 
the  forms  of  space  and  tim^e  in  order  to  get  at  the  real 
qualities  of  things,  if  their  presence  alone  renders  phe- 
nom.enal  all  our  perception  of  objects.  It  cannot  be  that 
such  is  Kant's  position.  Notice  what  he  says  in  Section 
4  of  the  Dissertation:  "Since  whatever  is  in  sensuous 
knowledge  depends  upon  the  subject's  peculiar  nature, 
as  the  latter  is  capable  of  receiving  somie  modification  or 
other  from  the  presence  of  objects  which,  on  account  of 
subjective  variety,  may  be  different  in  different  subjects, 
whilst  whatever  knowledge  is  exempt  from  such  sub- 
jective conditions,  regards  the  object  only;  it  is  plain  that 
what  is  sensuously  thought  is  the  representation  of 
things  as  they  appear,  while  the  intellectual  presenta- 
tions are  the  representations  of  things  as  they  are."''- 

From  the  above  quotation  it  will  be  seen  that  the 
argument  for  the  phenomenal  nature  of  sensuous  knowl- 
edge is  based  on  the  fact  that  each  person  possesses  his 
own  peculiar  organization,  not  on  the  theory  of  the  apri- 
ority of  space  and  time.  The  statement  which  I  have 
just  quoted  is  made  before  Kant  has  ever  mentioned 
space  or  time,  2  even  before  he  has  made  the  distinction 
between  form  and  matter  of  perception.  Thus  Kant's 
conclusion  as  to  the  phenomenal  character  of  all  human 
perception  does  not  follow  from  his  peculiar  theory  of 
space  and  time,  but,  rather,  from  a  point  of  view,  which 
is  by  no  means  new,  and  v/hich  is  most  clearly  expressed 
by  Kant,  himself,  in  the  Prolegomena:  "It  is  surely  in- 
conceivable how  the  perception  of  a  present  thing  should 
enable  me  to  know  it  as  it  is  in  inself,  seeing  that  its 
properties  cannot  pass  over  into  my  presentative 
faculty.  "3 

If  Kant's  only  reason  for  regarding  sensuous  knowl- 

1  Werke  II,  p.  400. 

2  These  forms  of  the  sensible  world  are  first  mentioned  as  such  in  section  13 
(n,  405). 

3  Werke  TV,  p.  31  (section  9  of  ProL). 

15 


edge  as  phenomenal  were  that  all  perception  must  con- 
form to  the  apriori  forms  of  space  and  time,  then  the 
so-called  secondary  qualities  would  represent  the  true 
nature  of  things.  I  mention  this  point  here  because  I 
think  we  shall  find  it  of  importance  in  dealing  with  that 
phase  of  our  inquiry  which  will  come  v/ithin  the  second 
chapter  of  this  essay.  ^  The  doctrine  of  the  ajrriority  of 
space  at  least  seems  to  have  been  of  importance  to  Kant 
chiefly  as  a  means  of  establishing  the  apodictic  certainty 
and  imiversal  validity  of  mathematical  propositions  in 
their  application  to  objects  of  perception, ^  and  this  ques- 
tion does  not  concern  us  here.  It  gives  Kant  an  oppor- 
tunity to  re-instate,  even  if  in  a  modified  form,  the  Ra- 
tionalism which  he  had  been  so  loath  to  give  up,  though 
for  sensuous  knowledge  the  qualification  is  now  neces- 
sary :  only  for  things  as  they  appear,  not  as  they  are  in 
themselves. 

Turning  now  to  the  other  source  of  knowledge,  the 
intellectual,  we  find  that,  according  to  the  Dissertation, 
the  intellect  has  a  double  use— a  logical  and  areal.^  The 
logical  use  we  have  already  noted:  it  consists  in  still 
further  transforming  our  perceptions  into  experience  by 
subordinating  them  to  conceptions. 

But  the  real  use  of  the  intellect,  and  this  is  the  im- 
portant one  for  us,  is  to  produce  pure  concepts.  These 
are  won  by  paying  heed  to  those  laws  which  the  mind 
employs  in  experience,  such  as  Possibility,  Necessity, 
Substance,  Cause,  etc.  Such  concepts  are  not  to  be 
sought  in  the  senses,  but  in  the  pure  intellect'.  They  are 
not  to  be  found  as  parts  of  any  sensuous  perception,  but 
are  won  for  consciousness,  as  indicated  above,  through 
reflexion  upon  that  experience  in  the  formation  of  which 
they  have  already  been  unconsciously  employed.  Their 
validity  is  thus  established  by  Kant  on  the  same  ground 
which  Hume  appealed  to  in  rejecting  them,  viz.,  because 
they  are  not  found  in  sensations  as  such.^ 

Having  made  the  distinction  mentioned  above  be- 
tween sense  and  understanding,  Kant  concludes,  as  we 
have  seen,  that  while  the  senses  give  us  things  as  they 
appear  only,  or  phenomena,  the  understanding  by  means 


1  I  may  say  in  advance  that  in  the  "Aesthetic"  also  I  find  no  evidence  for  the 
ordinary  interpretation  that  Kant  concludes  the  unknowableness  of  things  from  the 
apriority  of  space  and  time. 

■-*  That  it  is  the  applicability  of  Mathematics  for  which  Kant  particularly  con- 
tends is  emphasized  by  Paulsen— Vei-such,  pp.  6-8. 

3  Werke  II,  p,  402  (section  8), 

■*  Paulsen's  Versuch,  etc.,  pp.  106  ff. 

16 


of  its  concepts  reveals  to  us  noumena  or  things  as  they 
are.  As  Kant  says  himself  in  a  letter  to  Herz,^  the 
question  how  this  latter  is  possible  is  not  considered 
here.  Kant  seems  to  have  simply  adopted  the  stand- 
point of  Antiquity  whereby  the  phenomenon  or  object  of 
sense  is  distinguished  from  the  noumenon  or  object  of 
the  intellect,  2  and  this  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  he 
had  seen  the  inability  of  pure  thought  to  connect  itself 
with  the  nature  of  things.  ^ 

In  connection  with  Kant's  doctrine  in  the  Disserta- 
tion, I  wish  to  call  attention  particularly  to  his  notion  of 
a  noumenon.  It  is,  as  we  have  seen,  an  intelligible 
thing,  capable  of  definite  determinations  by  means  of 
the  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding.  These 
pure  concepts  or  laws  are  the  same  as  those  afterwards 
given  in  the  table  of  the  categories  in  the  Critique, 
so  that  in  this  connection  there  is  a  marked  difference 
between  the  standpoints  of  1770  and  1781.  It  is  briefiyy-v 
this:  <dn  the  Dissertation  these  laws  of  the  mind  applyV 
to  things  in  themselves,  noumena.  There  is  an  object- 
ive principle  in  the  intellect'^  by  means  of  which  it  can 
get  at  the  very  essence  of  things.  In  the  Critique,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  function  of  these  categories  is  limited 
to  the  sensuous  materials  given  us  in  experience,  and 
the  understanding  is  thus  forever  shut  off  from  an  ac- 
quaintance with  things  as  they  are.  Here,  then,  there 
is  no  place  for  a  noumenon  in  the  sense  in  which  that 
term  is  employed  in  the  Dissertation.  In  the  Critique 
there  are  no  intelligible  things.  Hence,  while  in  the 
Dissertation  the  terms  noumenon  and  'thing  in  itself 
are  used  synonymously,  there  is  a  wide  difference  be- 
tween noumenon  8ls  used  in  the  Dissertation  and  'thing 
in  itself  as  found  in  the  Critique.  The  former  is  a 
definitely  determined  thing,  the  latter  is  perfectly  in- 
determinate. This  point  is  only  mentioned  here  but 
will  be  more  fully  discussed  when  we  come  to  deal  with 
these  terms  in  the  Critique. 

The  reasons  for  such  a  change  of  standpoint  as  has 
been  indicated  can  be  found,  I  think,  in  the  Dissertation 
itself,  and  need  not  be  traced  to  any  outer  influence. 
In  the  first  place,  it  could  not  escape  the  notice  of  Kant, 


1  Werke  VIII,  p.  689. 

2  Werke  II,  p.  400. 

3  See  above  p.  12.     Paulsen  (Versuch,  etc.,  p.  124)  finds  in  this  an  evidence  of 
the  unwillingness  of  Kant  to  give  up  the  dogma  of  the  knovs^ableness  of  things. 

*  Werke  II,  p.  405  (section  13). 

17 


on  the  slightest  reflection,  that  in  the  second  part  of  his 
theory  in  the  Dissertation  he  has  returned  directly  and 
without  any  justification  to  the  old  Dogmatism  from 
which  he  had  set  out,  in  that  he  claims  for  pure  thought 
the  ability  to  know  things  as  they  are.  In  short,  his 
new  theory  involves  a  Pre-established  Harmony, '  and 
the  recognition  of  this  would  surely  be  enough  to  lead 
to  its  abandonment,  since  Kant  always  looked  on  such  a 
Metaphysical  theory  as  entirely  unphilosophical. 

Further  he  must  see  that  in  distinguishing  space 
and  time  as  forms  of  sensibility  from  the  matter  given 
in  sensation,  he  has  placed  space  and  time  in  an  analo- 
gous position  to  that  of  the  intellectual  forms.  If,  then, 
the  former  refer  to  phenomena  only,  why  should  not 
the  latter  share  the  same  fate? 

Toward  the  close  of  the  Dissertation,  Kant  shows 
that  he  is  dissatisfied  with  the  results  of  the  inquiry 
so  far  as  Metaphysics  is  concerned.  Metaphysics  being 
►with  him  the  science  of  the  pure  concepts. '  In  a  letter 
to  Lambert''  also,  he  says  that  the  whole  of  his  results 
on  the  positive  side  must  be  regarded  as  provisional. 
The  value  of  the  Dissertation  lies,  Kant  claims,  in  the 
removal  of  space  and  time  from  things  in  themselves, 
while  ultimately  this  side  of  his  doctrine  exists  only  for 
the  sake  of  the  positive  or  Metaphysical  side. 

Besides,  as  Caird  points  out,^  while  criticising  the 
perceived  world  from  the  point  of  view  of  intelligence, 
he  also  shows  himself  dissatisfied  with  the  knowledge 
of  noumena  by  means  of  pure  intelligence;  for  he  re- 
gards knowledge  gained  from  concepts  alone  as  imper- 
fect, since  it  is  merely  general  and  cannot  be  realized 
in  concreto  in  perception.  *  Here  Kant  already  sets  up 
as  the  ideal  for  intelligence  an  intellectual  perception 
which  shall  overcome  the  disadvantages  of  both  percep- 
tion and  intelligence  as  we  human  beings  have  them. 
Only  an  intelligence  to  which  perception  and  conception 
were  the  same,  whose  relationship  to  things  in  them- 
selves would  be  the  same  as  that  of  perception  to  phen- 
omena, i.  e.  their  creator,  could  satisfy  the  demand 
which  Kant  here  makes  upon  thought.®    Thus  while 


1  Windelband,  Gesch.  d.  neueren  Phil.  Vol.  II,  p.  41. 

2  Werke  II.  p.  415,  section  22.  cf .  Werke  III,  p.  5,  and  Benno  Erdmann  in  Phil. 
Monatshefte  XIX.  p.  133. 

3  Werke  VIII,  p.  663. 

*  Crit.  Phil.  Vol.  I,  pp.  185-7. 

5  Werke  II,  p.  419.  section  25. 

6  Windelband  in  Vierteljahrschrif  1 1,  p.  247. 

18 


nominally  holding  to  the  doctrine  of  the  knowableness 
of  things  by  means  of  pure  conception,  Kant  has  already 
practically  given  it  up  and  said  in  effect:  only  God 
can  know  things  as  they  are. 

The  famous  letter  to  Herz, '  written  on  February 
21st,  1772,  shows  to  some  extent  how  these  difficulties 
shaped  themselves  in  Kant's  mind;  and  after  such  a 
view  as  we  have  taken  of  his  preceding  development 
it  will  not  seem  strange  to  us  that  they  center  around 
the  problem  how  our  ideas  may  refer  to  objects.  "I 
put  this  question  to  myself,  on  what  ground  rests  the 
relation  of  that  in  us  which  we  call  an  idea  to  objects? 
.  .  .  It  is  intelligible  how  our  ideas,  so  far  as  they 
are  sensuous  affections  passively  received,  should  have 
a  relation  to  objects,  and  also  how  the  forms  of  sense, 
though  borrowed  from  the  nature  of  our  soul,  should 
nevertheless  apply  to  all  things  in  so  far  as  they  are 
presented  in  sense.  .  .  .  But  now  we  must  ask  in 
what  other  way  an  idea  is  possible  which  refers  to  an 
object  without  being  the  effect  of  an  impression  from 
that  object?  I  ventured  in  the  Dissertation  to  say  that 
the  ideas  of  sense  represent  things  as  they  appear,  while 
the  conceptions  of  the  understanding  represent  things 
as  they  are.  But  how  can  the  ideas  of  these  things  be 
given  to  us  if  not  by  the  manner  in  which  they  affect 
us?  Whence  the  agreement  which  these  ideas  are  sup- 
posed to  have  with  objects  which  are  yet  not  their  pro- 
ducts? How  can  pure  reason  lay  down  axioms  about 
things  without  any  experience  of  them?  etc."^ 

Kant  does  not  even  pretend  to  solve  the  difficulty 
here,  or  give  us  an  answer  to  these  questions  which  he 
has  raised,  but  the  solution  comes  in  the  Critique  _  of 
Pure  Reason:  the  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding 
just  as  the  pure  forms  of  sensibility  can  refer  only  to 
phenomena. 

Here,  then,  we  have  the  general  standpoint  of  the 
third  period  in  Kant's  development,  viz.,  there  is  knowl- 
edge by  means  of  pure  reason  but  of  phenomena  only,  not 
of  things  as  they  are  in  themselves. 

Having  now  traced  the  development  of  Kant's 
Epistemology  from  its  beginnings  to  the  standpoint  of 
his  final  system,  let  us  here  attempt  to  sum  up  what  we 
have  found  to  be  his  attitude  to  the  relation  of  thought 


1  Werke  VIII,  pp  688  flF. 

2  Werke  VIII,  pp  689-690. 

19 


and  reality  in  each  of  the  three  stages  in  that  develop- 
ment. 

In  the  first  period,  thought  can  reach  the  essence 
of  things  by  following  the  principles  of  contradiction 
and  sufficient  reason.  As  the  latter  is  not  regarded  as 
dependent  upon  experience  it  would  seem  that  thought 
alone  is  able  to  reveal  the  qualities  of  things  in  them- 
selves, those  qualities  not  differing  from  our  concep- 
tions of  them.  On  such  a  supposition  the  'thing  in  it- 
self need  perform  no  function  whatever  in  knowledge, 
since  Reason  can  construct  the  whole  world  of  Reality 
out  of  its  own  resources,  that  world  agreeing  with  the 
concepts  of  pure  thought.  Here  there  is  no  room  for 
Epistemology,  there  can  be  no  question  of  how  thought 
or  ideas  can  refer  to  reality,  since  they  are  the  same. 

In  the  second  period,-  however,  Kant  finds  it  neces- 
sary to  base  the  second  principle  of  reason  on  experi- 
ence, since  "matters  of  fact"  can  only  be  determined 
in  that  way.  Reason  now  being  left  with  the  sole  prin- 
ciple of  contradiction,  can  deal  only  with  its  own  con- 
ceptions and  can  never  give  us  things  as  they  are.  Its 
function  is  thus  not  nearly  so  important  as  in  the  earlier 
period,  and  a  corresponding  increase  of  responsibility 
for  knowledge  is  thrown  upon  things.  Inasmuch  as 
Kant  did  not  along  with  his  Empiricism  adopt  the 
atomistic  view  of  experience  as  made  up  of  a  number  of 
isolated  sensations,  it  would  seem  that  at  this  time  the 
'thing  in  itself  has  a  most  important  function  for 
knowledge.  In  sensation  it  gives  us  not  only  its  own 
qualities,  but  also  the  laws  of  its  relations  to  other 
things.  Of  course  the  above  is  simply  inference  from 
Kant's  main  doctrines  since  he  did  not  deal  at  all  ex- 
plicitly with  our  question,  nor  indeed  could  he  until  he 
had  himself  carefully  drawn  the  distinction  which  he 
made  later  between  'thing  in  itself  and  phenomenon. 

Finally  at  the  standpoint  at  which  we  have  now 
arrived,  our  knowledge  can  refer  only  to  the  world  of 
experience,  real  or  possible,  and  that  not  of  things  in 
themselves  but  only  of  phenomena.  It  remains  to  en- 
quire what  function  the  'thing  in  itself  has  to  perform 
for  knowledge  in  this  the  final  stage  of  Kant's  thought. 


20 


CHAPTER    II. 

THE  FUNCTION  OF  THE    'THING  IN  ITSELF'   IN    THE    DE- 
TERMINATION OF  THE  PRIMARY     AND     SECOND- 
ARY QUALITIES  OF  OBJECTS. 

Section  1.  That  space  and  time  are  not  qualities 
of  things  in  themselves  but  of  phenomena  only  has 
already  been  shown  to  be  the  chief  negative  result  of 
Kant's  Inaugural  Dissertation.  In  the  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason,  too,  that  part  entitled  "Transcendental 
Aesthetic"  enforces  the  same  doctrine,  the  reasons 
given  for  its  acceptance  being  practically  the  same  here 
as  there.  The  later  work,  however,  presents  in  more 
systematic  form  and  in  clearer  light  what  is  contained 
in  germ  in  the  earlier. 

In  the  Aesthetic  Kant  first  seeks  to  prove  that 
space  and  time  are  a  priori  perceptions  not  empirical 
concepts.  The  several  arguments  by  means  of  which 
he  seeks  to  establish  such  a  conclusion  need  not  here  be 
mentioned  or  discussed.^  But  the  corollary  that  space 
and  time  are  not  quahties  of  things^  must  be  considered. 
The  argument  on  this  point  runs  somewhat  as  follows: 

In  the  first  place,  on  no  other  justifiable  supposition 
can  the  fact  (to  Kant's  mind)  of  a  priori  knowledge  of 
space  and  time  be  explained.  '  'For  no  determinations 
of  objects,  whether  belonging  to  them  absolutely  or  in 
relation  to  others,  can  enter  our  perception  before  the 
actual  existence  of  the  objects  themselves,  that  is  to 
say,  they  can  never  be  perceptions  a  priori.''^  Now 
space  and  time  have  been  shown  to  be  a  priori  percep- 
tions so  they  cannot  be  qualities  in  things. 

But  what  do  we  mean  by  saying  that  they  are  a 
priori  perceptions?  Perception  implies  the  presence  of 
the  object.  A  priori  perception  would  therefore 
seem  to  be  a  contradiction  in  terms.  The  solution  of 
this  apparent  contradiction  is  that  space  and  time  are 
just  forms  of  perception,  modes  of  sensibility  to  which 
all  perception  must  be  subject,  but  that  they  bear  no 
resemblance  to  any  characteristic  of  things  as  they  are. 
Thus  the  fact  of  a  priori  knowledge  of  space  and  time 

1  Werke  III,  pp  58-61  and  64-66  cf .  Werke  III.  pp  72-79. 

2  Werke  III,  pp  61-64  and  66-68. 

3  Werke  III,  p  61  cf.  pp  67  and  72  ff.  This  quotation  seems  to  me  to  sum 
up  Kant's  argrument  in  the  Aesthetic  for  the  phenomenality  of  space  and  time. 

21     • 


serves  as  sufficient  proof  that  they  refer  to  phenomena 
only.^ 

Further,  Kant  argues,  even  if  space  and  time  w^ere 
empirical  concepts,  they  could  not  be  determinations  of 
things  as  they  are;  for  ''it  is  surely  inconceivable  how 
the  perception  of  a  present  thing  should  enable  me  to 
know  it  as  it  is  in  itself,  seeing  that  its  properties  can- 
not pass  over  into  my  presentative  faculty."^  As 
noticed  above  in  our  discussion  of  the  Dissertation,^  a 
similar  view  is  to  be  met  with  there.  Not  only  space 
and  time  but  all  our  subjective  conditions  determine 
the  nature  of  the  qualities  which. we  perceive  in  objects, 
so  that  "if  we  drop  our  subject  or  subjective   form   of 

our  senses,  all  qualities would  vanish. '  '.^    Hence 

we  know  nothing  but  our  manner  of  perceiving  objects, 
not  the  objects  as  they  are  in  themselves. 

This  latter  argument  of  Kant  holds,  as  may  be 
seen  from  the  above  quotation,  of  those  qualities  also 
which,  before  his  time,  had  been  known  as  secondary, 
such  as  colour,  taste,  smell,  etc.  These  had  already 
been  shown  to  be  '  'modifications  only  of  our  sensibil- 
ity;" and  Kant  claims  that  his  doctrine  of  the  Ideality 
of  all  the  qualities  of  the  objects  of  experience,  pri- 
mary and  secondary  alike,  is  from  one  point  of  view 
simply  an  extension  of  the  teachings  of  Locke.  So  far 
then  Kant's  position  does  not  differ  essentially  from 
that  of  Berkeley,  if  we  leave  out  of  account  Berkeley's 
further  Metaphysical  conclusions. 

But  from  another  point  of  view  Kant  proceeds  to 
re-establish  the  distinction  of  Locke  between  primary 
and  secondary  qualities.  Both  kinds  of  qualities  do 
indeed  refer  to  phenomena  only,  things  as  they  appear 
to  us,  not  to  things  as  they  are  in  themselves.  Yet  with- 
in experience  there  is  an  essential  difference  between 
them.  '  'With  the  exception  of  space  there  is  no  other 
subjective  representation  referring  to  something  ex- 
ternal that  would  be  called  a  priori  objective."^  Under- 
standing here  by  the  word  "objective"  the  signification 
given  to  it  by  Kant  throughout  his  Epistemology,  viz. 
that  which  is  "universal  and  necessary,  "*^  we  find  that 
it  is  in  strict  agreement  with  his  general  teaching  on 
the  nature  of  the  various  qualities  of  empirical  objects. 


1  Werke  III.  p  61  and  IV  pp  30-31  (Sections  8  and  9  of  Prolegomena. ) 

2  Werke  IV.  p  31.  3     pp  21-22  above. 
*      Werke  III,  p  72. 

5      Werke  III,  p  63.         «     Werke  III,  pp  73  and  74  cf.   also  Werke   III.    p  179 
and  IV,  p  47. 

22 


^^  i: 


Space  and  Time  are  forms  under  which  all  human  per- 
ception takes  place.  We  human  beings  could  never 
perceive  anything  except  ''under  the  indefeasible  con- 
ditions of  space  and  time.  "^  You  cannot  even  imagine 
an  object,  says  Kant,  without  attributing  to  it  spatial 
determinations  and  giving  it  some  position  in  space  and 
time.  They  are  thus  universal  conditions  of  exper- 
ience, without  which  all  perception  of  objects  as  we 
have  it  would  be  impossible.  They  render  experience 
itself  possible.  2 

The  secondary  qualities,  on  the  other  hand,  are 
"accidentally  added  effects  only  of  our  peculiar  organi- 
zation. "^  They  may  differ  for  different  subjects  or  for 
the  same  subject  at  different  times.  Further,  they  are 
dependent  on  experience  i.  e.  on  sensations,  so  are  not 
representations  a  priori.  '  'No  one  can  have  a  priori 
an  idea  either  of  colour  or  of  taste,  but  space  refers  to 
the  pure  form  of  perception  only  and  involves  no  kind 
of  sensation,  nothing  empirical."'* 

From  the  foregoing  it  seems  evident  that  while 
Kant  places  both  primary  and  secondary  qualities  on 
the  same  plane  as  not  belonging  to  things  in  them- 
selves, he  yet  introduces  the  old  distinction  from  a  new 
point  of  view  by  calling  the  former  a  priori  and  the 
latter    a  posteriori  and  dependent  on  sensation. 

Section  2.  Having  noticed  in  a  general  way 
Kant's  doctrine  of  the  phenomenal  nature  of  all  the 
qualities  of  objects  to  be  met  with  in  our  experience,  it 
is  now  in  order  to  examine  his  statements  with  a  view 
to  an  answer  to  our  particular  question,  viz.,  what  does 
the  'thing  in  itself  contribute  to  the  perception  of 
these  two  kinds  of  qualities  respectively?  We  have 
seen  that  none  of  them  can  be  looked  upon  as  deter- 
minations of  things  in  themselves,  but  the  question 
still  remains:  have  they  then  any  basis  in  the  nature  of 
things?  Is  there  any  corresponding  characteristic  in 
things  which,  though  itself  neither  space,  time,  nor 
any  empirical  quality,  yet  on  being  presented  to  the 
mind  is  read  off,  so  to  speak,  as  this  or  that  quality  of 
the  object  before  us  in  perception? 

First  as  to  space  and  time,  it  seems  clear  from 
what  has  been  already  said  that  these  can  have  nothing 


Werke  III.  p  72  cf .  also  pp  73  and  74. 

Werke  III,  p  59  and  65. 

Werke  III,  p  63. 

Werke  III,  p  63  cf .  also  p  164. 

23 


in  common  with  the  nature  of  things.  To  treat  them 
as  a  priori  and  entirely  independent  of  sensation  in 
contrast  with  the  secondary  quahties  which  are  a 
posteriori  and  dependent  on  sensation^  is  equal  to  say- 
ing that  the  former  are  purely  mind  given.  Kant 
would  surely  not  admit  that  space  or  time  can  be 
objective  in  any  sense,  not  even  a  corresponding  qual- 
ity in  things  could  be  allowed  by  him.  He  warns  us 
against  such  an  interpretation  of  his  doctrine  by  con- 
trasting, as  above  noticed,  space  with  such  qualities  of 
objects  as  colour,  taste,  etc.  Proofs  of  the  ideality  of 
space  and  time  based  on  the  analogy  of  the  other 
qualities  are  quite  insufficient.  ^  We  have  undoubtedly 
a  capacity  for  sensing  objects  as  coloured,  but  that  does 
not  alone  constitute  a  claim  to  a  priority,  in  Kant's 
meaning,  for  colour.  Colour,  taste,  etc.,  all  those 
qualities  which  were  previously  termed  secondary,  are 
considered  a  posteriori;  they  are  given  in  the  sensation, 
not  imparted  to  it.  But  this  view  of  the  primary 
qualities  has  an  important  inference  attaching  to  it  in 
regard  to  the  secondary.  The  former  we  have  seen  are 
purely  mind  given  and  have  no  basis  whatever  in  the 
nature  of  things.  The  consequence  of  this  is  that  Kant 
is  deprived  of  the  usual  method  of  explaining  the 
secondary  as  due  to  certain  modifications  and  combina- 
tions of  the  spatial  attributes.  For  since  space  is  no 
attribute  of  things  in  themselves,  it  will  not  do  to  offer 
this  as  an  explanation  of  the  variety  or  even  the 
presence  of  such  sensations  in  consciousness.  Only  on 
one  hypothesis  would  such  a  view  be  reconcilable  with 
Kant's  doctrine  of  space— if  the  phenomenal  object 
and  not  the  'thing  in  itself  affects  sensibility.  But  as 
we  shall  show  in  a  following  section  that  such  an 
hypothesis  is  wholly  untenable,  the  possibility  of  the 
explanation  suggested  need  not  be  considered.  What 
then  can  be  the  explanation  on  Kant's  principles? 
Obviously  only  this,  that  there  is  some  quality  in  the 
things  which  corresponds,  so  to  speak,  to  the  secondary 
qualities.  This  quality  in  the  things  is  not  colour, 
taste,  smell,  nor  any  such  empirical  attribute  of  objects, 
but  it  is  something  which  so  affects  sensibility  as  to 
cause  in  us  the  particular  sensation  of  colour  or  what 
not,  and  may  therefore  be  regarded  as  a  correspondent 
quality.     In  this  way  the  relative  value  of  the  empiri- 


1  Werke  III.  p  63. 

2  Werke  HI,  p  64. 


24 


cal  qualities  of  objects  is  the  reverse  of  that  suggested 
by  Locke.  To  him  the  primary  qualities  bring  us  into 
intimate  relation  with  the  things,  while  the  secondary 
are  only  subjective  affections,  due  indeed  to  the  action 
of  things  upon  sense  but  "modifications  only  of  our 
peculiar  organization"  and  in  no  way  revealing  the 
nature  of  things.  For  Kant  all  are  alike  subjective  but 
space  and  time  are  not  due  to  experience.  They  are 
original  possessions  of  the  mind  and  have  no  relation  to 
things  as  they  are.  The  other  qualities  are  induced  by 
the  action  of  things  upon  sense  and  so  may  be  regarded 
as  mental  modifications  to  which  there  must  correspond 
what  Locke  calls  certain  "powers"  in  the  things. 

Assuredly  Kant  himself  never  supposed  that  his 
doctrine  involved  such  a  consequence,  but  I  do  not  see 
how  he  is  to  escape  it  without  reconstructing  his  theory 
of  the  ideality  of  space  and  time. 

Section  3.  But  though  we  have  dealt  with  Kant's 
doctrine  of  space  in  general  and  discovered  certain  im- 
plications of  his  general  theory  in  regard  also  to  the 
secondary  qualities,  there  still  remains  an  important 
problem  for  Kant's  theory  of  space.  The  general  prop- 
erty of  extension  we  have  seen  to  be  purely  mind  given 
and  not  due  to  sensation  at  all.  What  then  about  par- 
ticular figures?  Whence  the  great  variety  in  the  spa- 
tial determinations  of  objects?  Are  all  these  forms  and 
figures  traceable  also  to  the  a  priori  equipment  of  the 
mind,  or  does  the  'thing  in  itself  give  the  cue  to  indi- 
cate the  particular  construction  to  be  carried  out? 

In  the  attempt  to  answer  any  question  concerning 
the  function  of  the  'thing  in  itself  we  are  met  by  an 
immediate  difficulty.  The  'thing  in  itself  is  entirely  un- 
knotvn  and  unknoivable.  It  never  comes  within  the 
range  of  our  experience,  and  no  enquiry,  however  care- 
ful and  exhaustive,  can  succeed  in  laying  bare  its  qual- 
ities before  us. 

All  that  the  human  intelligence  can  attain  to  is  a 
knowlege  of  its  own  states.  If  then  our  questions  can 
be  answered  at  all  it  must  be  through  an  analysis  of 
these  states,  through  an  enquiry  into  their  origin  and 
into  the  subjective  and  objective  factors  that  go  to  make 
them  up.  In  this  way  we  cannot  hope  to  answer  the 
question,  what  are  the  qualities  or  modes  of  existence  of 
the  'thing  in  itself  ?  But  we  do  hope  to  be  able  to  de- 
termine its  contribution  to  experience  as  we  have  it. 
Experience  is  not  merely  a  dream  or  mere  fiction  of  the 

25 


imagination,  not  merely  "a  finely  woven  cobweb  of  the 
brain,"  It  is  the  product  of  the  mind's  activity  upon 
sensations  that  are  given  in  Sensibility.  That  Sensi- 
bility is  regarded  by  Kant  as  passive  and  receptive,  as 
capable  of  receiving  sensations  only  in  so  far  as  it  is 
affected  by  objects.  In  fact  sensation  is  just  "the 
effect  produced  by  an  object  upon  the  faculty  of  repre- 
sentation, so  far  as  we  are  affected  by  it.  "^ 

What  then  are  the  objects  that  affect  sensibility? 
Should  it  be  that  the  'thing  in  itself  is  that  object 
which  by  affection  of  sensibility  produces  sensation  in 
us,  then  our  question  as  to  the  contribution  of  the  'thing 
in  itself  to  experience  resolves  itself  into  this:  how 
much  is  involved  in  the  mere  sensation  as  such?  In  other 
words,  what  would  experience  be  if  our  minds  were 
purely  passive  and  receptive?  If  however,  that  which 
Kant  would  hold  to  affect  sensibility  so  as  to  produce 
sensation  be  not  the  'thing  in  itself,  then  our  question 
as  to  its  contribution  is  vain  and  the  attempt  to  answer 
it  must  prove  futile.  In  this  case  our  enquiry,  would 
end  here.  For  if  sensation  is  not  the  effect  of  the 
action  of  the  'thing  in  itself  upon  sense,  we  touch  it  at 
no  point;  and  we  not  only  are  unable  to  answer  what  it 
is  but  we  can  say  nothing  about  what  it  does.  The 
'thing  in  itself  can  be  nothing  for  knowledge  nor  can 
it  have  anything  to  do  with  the  determination  of  know- 
ledge if  it  has  no  function  to  perform  in  sensation,  since 
the  further  manipulation  of  sensations  when  once  they 
are  received  in  consciousness  is  a  work  of  the  subject 
alone.  It  was  on  the  supposition  that  we  can  determine 
what  the  'thing  in  itself  does,  even  though  we  know 
not  what  it  is,  that  we  have  started  on  our  enquiry. 
Since,  however,  it  never  shows  itself  in  experience,  and 
experience  is  the  result  of  the  activity  of  thought  upon 
sensation,  we  must  look  for  the  activity  of  the  'thing  in 
itself, '  if  at  all,  in  the  production  of  sensation,  and  for  its 
function  in  knowledge  in  the  nature  of  sensation.  Ac- 
cordingly we  shall  attempt  to  show  in  the  following  para- 
graphs that  the  'thing  in  itself  does  affect  sensibility  and 
that  nothing  else  does.  In  doing  so  we  do  not  imply  that 
Kant  would  consider  any  knowledge  of  things  in  them- 
selves possible.  It  will  rather  be  our  task  to  show  in 
the  first  place  that  the  expression  'thing  in  itself  simply 
means  the  unknown  cause  of  our  sensations,  that  which 

1  Werke  III,  p  56.  cf .  in  this  connection  the  first  few  pa^es  of  the  Aesthetic. 

26 


affects  sensibility,  and  in  the  second  place  that  no  ex- 
ternal affection  of  sensibility  takes  place  except 
through  the  action  of  the  'thing  in  itself. 

Furthermore,  in  the  references  which  we  must  give 
to  substantiate  our  interpretation  of  Kant  above  men- 
tioned, the  phrase  'transcendental  object',  less  often 
'noumenon',  is  used  where  we  might  expect  'thing  in 
itself  if  our  view  is  correct.  So  it  seems  advisable  to 
give  our  reasons  for  identifying  'thing  in  itself,  'tran- 
scendental object',  and  "noumenon'  in  the  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason  before  we  proceed  to  quote  passages  where 
these  latter  terms  are  employed,  in  support  of  our  con- 
tention that  the  'thing  in  itself  is  the  cause  of  sensa- 
tion. Hence  the  remaining  portion  of  this  section  will 
fall  into  two  parts.  The  first  will  give  reasons  for 
believing  that  the  above  mentioned  terms  are  used  syn- 
onymously by  Kant  in  the  Critique,  and  the  second  will 
attempt  to  prove  that  Kant  regarded  the  'thing  in 
itself,  the  transcendental  object',  or  the  'noumenon'  as 
the  ground  of  our  sensations. 

(A).— Already  in  the  Aesthetic  we  find  Kant  sud- 
denly introducing  the  expression  'transcendental  object' 
in  the  midst  of  a  discussion  intended  to  demonstrate 
the  incognisability  of  things  in  themselves.  Just  as  he 
had  been  saying  in  the  paragraphs  preceding  of  the 
'thing  in  itself,  so  he  says  here  of  the  'transcendental 
object'  that  it  must  ever  remain  unknown  to  us.i  On 
several  occasions  throughout  the  Analytic  Kant  drops 
without  warning  from  one  expression  to  the  other  and 
continually  makes  use  of  the  same  language  in  refer- 
ence to  both.  2  In  the  chapter  "On  the  ground  of  dis- 
tinction of  all  objects  in  general  into  phenomena  and 
noumena"  we  are  given  a  definition  of  a  'transcend- 
ental object. '  "Thought  is  the  act  of  referring  a  given 
perception  to  an  object.  If  the  manner  of  this  per- 
ception is  in  no  way  given,  then  the  object  is  transcend- 
ental, and  the  concept  of  the  understanding  admits  of  a 
transcendental  use  only"  etc.^  This  use  of  the  cate- 
gories can  be  of  no  value,  Kant  argues,  because  it  can 
have  no  definite  or  even  definable  object. ^  The  only 
definable  objects  are  empirical  ones,  but  when  we  step 


1  Werke  III,  p  74.  cf.  p  175. 

2  See  particularly  the  "Transcendental   Deduction"  of  the  first  edition,    and 
the  passages  leading  up  to  it  Werke  III  pp  571  and  573  etc. 

3  Werke  III,  p  215. 
♦  cf.  p  216. 

27 


beyond  the  bounds  of  space  and  time  we  can  not  say- 
just  what  an  object  may  be  like  which  is  independent 
of  perception.  Objects  of  perception  are  phenomena, 
objects  when  "the  manner  of  the  perception  is  not 
given"  can  be  nothing  else  than  things  in  themselves. 
Here  they  are  called  "transcendental." 

To  show  that  'thing  in  itself  and  'transcendental 
object'  are  one  and  the  same  it  is  only  necessary  to  find 
what  Kant  means  by  a  transcendental  use  of  the 
categories.  Above  we  have  seen  this  use  identified 
with  their  application  to  "transcendental  objects." 
Here  is  what  he  says  in  another  place:  "What  we  call 
the  transcendental  use  of  a  concept  is  its  being  referred 
to  things  in  general  and  to  things  in  themselves."^ 
This  seems  practically  the  same  as  an  identification  of 
'transcendental  object'  with  'thing  in  itself.' 

At  the  end  of  this  same  chapter,  in  the  '  'note  on 
the  Amphiboly  of  Reflective  Concepts,"  Kant  makes 
one  of  his  attacks  upon  that  Rationalism  which  postu- 
lates an  intelligible  object,  knowable  through  the  cate- 
gories alone.  In  contrast  with  this  he  explains  his  own 
position  as  follows:  "The  understanding  therefore 
limits  the  sensibility  without  enlarging  thereby  its  own 
field,  and  by  warning  the  latter  that  it  can  never  apply 
to  things  by  themselves,  but  to  phenomena  only,  it 
forms  the  thought  of  an  object  in  itself,  but  as  trans- 
cendental only,  which  is  the  cause  of  phenomena  and 
therefore  never  itself  a  phenomenon  etc.  "2  The  above 
quotation  speaks  for  itself. 

But  we  have  yet  to  show  that  'noumenon'  is 
another  term  for  the  same  object.  "This  cannot  be 
the  case"  some  one  may  say.  "Here  are  Kant's  own 
words,"— "The  object  to  which  I  refer  any  phenom- 
enon is  a  transcendental  object,  that  is,  the  entirely 
indefinite  thought  of  something  in  general.  This  can- 
not be  called  the  noumenon,  for  I  know  nothing  of 
what  it  is  by  itself  etc."^  Now  the  last  clause  of  this 
quotation  itself  is  sufficient  to  show  what  Kant  means 
here  by  'noumenon:'  it  is  something  which  can  be 
known.  This  whole  chapter  in  fact  is  directed  against 
such  a  conception  of  noumenon  as  Kant  himself  con- 
tended for  in  the  Inaugural  Dissertation,  viz, ,  an  intel- 


1  Werke  III,  p.  211.  cf.  also  p  212. 

2  Werke  III,  p.  241. 

3  Werke  III,  p.  218. 

28 


ligible  object,  capable  of  definite  determination  and 
quite  within  the  range  of  pure  thought.^  There  Kant, 
as  we  have  already  seen,  simply  adopted  the  distinction 
of  Plato  between  phenomena  and  noumena,  and  made 
it  a  part  of  his  own  system. 

In  the  Critique,  however,  no  such  extension  of  know- 
ledge is  allowable;  consequently  his  former  conception 
of  'noumenon'  is  inadmissable.  And  when  Kant  in  the 
passage  quoted  tells  us  that  the  'transcendental  object' 
cannot  be  the  'noumenon'  he  refers  to  what  he  after- 
wards calls  the  "noumenon  in  positive  sense,  "^  i.  e.  an 
intelligible  thing.  This  is  evident  from  the  context; 
for  in  the  paragraph  preceding  the  one  in  which  Kant 
distinguishes  'transcendental  odject'  and  'noumenon,' 
he  points  out  that  in  order  to  justify  the  conception  of 
'noumenon'  we  must  postulate  another  kind  of  percep- 
tion than  the  human,  just  as  later  on  he  tells  us  that  the 
'positive  noumenon'  is  not  only  a  problem  but  the  mind 
that  could  know  it  is  itself  a  problem.  ^ 

But  Kant  does  justify  the  conception  of  'noumenon* 
in  the  negative  sense  and  it  is  this  which  we  find  iden- 
tical in  Kant  with  'trancendental  object.'  The  very 
notion  of  phenomena  implies  that  of  noumena,  but 
merely  as  a  limitative  conception,  which  shall  ever  re- 
mind us  that  our  knowledge  extends  only  to  phenomena 
and  not  to  things  in  themselves.  After  directing  his 
polemic  for  several  pages  against  the  noumenon  in  the 
positive  sense,  Kant  says,  '  'With  all  this  the  concept  of 
a  'noumenon'  if  taken  problematically  remains  not  only 
admissable,  but  as  a  concept  to  limit  the  sphere  of  sen- 
sibility indispensible.  In  this  case,  however,  it  is  not  a 
purely  intelligible  object  for  our  understanding,  but  an 
understanding  to  which  it  could  belong  is  itself  a  prob- 
lem etc.  .  .  .  Our  understanding  thus  acquires  a 
kind  of  negative  extension,  that  is,  it  does  not  become 
itself  limited  by  sensibility,  but,  on  the  contrary,  limits 
it  by  calling  things  in  themselves  noumena.'"^  In  this 
passage  the  'thing  in  itself  is  expressly  identified  with 
'noumenon'  in  the  negative  sense.  One  passage  more 
will  show  the  identification  of  the  latter  with  'transcen- 
dental object' 

In  one  of  the  closing  paragraphs  of  the  Analytic,  a 

1  cf.  pp.  24,  28  and  29  above. 

2  Werke  III,  p.  219. 

3  See  Werke  III,  p,  218  cf.  p.  222. 
*  Werke  III,  p.  222. 

29 


portion  of  which  we  have  already  quoted/  Kant  furth- 
er speaks  of  this  Hmitation  of  sensibility  by  the  concept 
of  an  "object  in  itself,  but  as  trancendental  only;"  it 
"cannot  be  thought  as  quantity,  nor  as  reality,  nor  as 
substance;"  in  short  none  of  the  categories  can  be  ap- 
plied to  this  'transcendental  object.'  Then  Kant  adds: 
"if  we  like  to  call  this  object  'noumenon'  because  the 
representation  of  it  is  not  sensuous,  we  are  at  liberty  to 
do  so:"^  for  this  just  answers  to  the  descriptions  given 
of  the  'noumenon'  in  the  negative  sense.  Hence  I  think 
we  can  conclude  that  for  Kant  the  terms,  'thing  in  it- 
self,'  'transcendental  object,'  and  'noumenon'  in  the 
negative  sense  have  the  same  significance.  In  fact  in 
some  of  the  quotations  which  we  have  still  to  make  in 
regard  to  another  point,  we  shall  find  him  using  the 
phrase  "transcendental  object  or  noumenon;"  but  we 
must  always  remember  that  this  is  noumenon  only  in 
its  limitative  sense,  not  the  "intelligible  thing"  against 
which  he  directs  such  a  polemic  in  the  chapter  "On  the 
ground  of  the  distinction  of  all  objects  into  phenomena 
and  noumena. " 

B.— Our  next  task  is  to  show  that  the  'thing  in  its- 
elf is  the  cause  of  our  sensations,  and  that  nothing  else 
can  be,  on  Kantian  principles.  On  this  second  point,  we 
shall  have  to  take  issue  with  Dr.  Vaihinger  who,  in  the 
Strassburger  Abhandlung^  as  well  as  in  the  Commen- 
tary to  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,"*  holds  that  there 
are  two  kinds  of  affection  spoken  of  by  Kant  in  the 
Critique,  which  he  calls  transcendental  and  empirical 
or  phenomenal  respectively.  The  former  term  refers 
to  an  affection  of  sensibility  through  the  action  upon  it 
of  the  'transcendental  object'  or  'thing  in  itself,'  the 
latter  to  an  affection  by  the  phenomenal  objects  in 
space.  This  "phenomenal  affection"  we  shall  attempt 
to  refute,  but  in  seeking  to  establish  the  "transcend- 
ental affection"  we  shall  be  guided  and  assisted  very 
materially  by  the  arguments  of  Dr.  Vaihinger. 

In  support  of  the  view  that  Kant  believed  in  an 
affection  of  the  sensibility  by  objects  in  space, 
Vaihinger  quotes  such  passages  as  the  following: 
"Colours  are  modifications  only  of  our  sense  of  sight, 
as  it  is  affected  in  different  ways  by   light."^     "What 

^  See  page  55. 

2  Werke  Ul.  p.  241. 

3  Strassburger  Abhandlung  (1884)  pp.  146-164. 

*  Commentor  zur  Kritik  d.  r.  Vernunft  Vol.  II,  pp.  35-55. 
5  Werke  III,  p.  63. 

30 


corresponds  to  every  empirical  sensation  is  reality 
(realitas  phenomenon),"^  and  several  other  passages 
in  which  Kant  speaks  of  '  'that  which  in  the  phenom- 
enon corresponds  to  sensation. '  '^ 

In  regard  to  the  first  of  these  quotations  and  sim- 
ilar expressions  throughout  the  Critique,  it  seems 
suffiicient  to  say  that  Kant  is  speaking  popularly.  On 
no  occasion  when  he  uses  such  expressions  is  he  setting 
forth  a  theory  of  "affection,"  and  it  is  not  natural  that 
Kant  should  always  adopt  such  language  as  his  "Trans- 
cendental Idealism"  would  suggest;  since  this  would 
tend  to  obscure  the  point  of  importance  and  would  only 
appear  pedantic. 

On  the  use  of  the  word  "correspond"  which  has 
been  noticed  above,  the  following  consideration  seems 
ample  justification  of  it  in  accordance  with  Kant's 
principles.  Kant  regards  sensation  as  a  mere  sub- 
jective affection,  while  the  phenomenon  is  the  same 
sensation  or  a  collection  of  them  clothed  with  the  forms 
of  space  and  time  and  determined  by  the  activity  of  the 
categories.  3  The  phenomenon  has  thus  in  itself  both  a 
sensational  and  a  thought  element  before  it  can  be 
regarded  as  an  object. 

It  seems  perfectly  legitimate,  therefore,  for  Kant 
to  speak  of  "that  which  in  the  phenomenon  corresponds 
to  the  sensation, ' '  without  thereby  implying  any  such 
theory  as  that  indicated  by  Vaihinger.  Still  more 
decidedly  against  such  a  view  are  certain  statements  of 
Kant  himself  in  the  Dialectic,  in  opposition  to  which  no 
such  clear  statements  can  be  found  which  would  go  to 
substantiate  Vaihinger's  interpretation.  Here  are  a 
few  of  them:  "Both  (bodies  and  movement)  are  not 
something  outside  us,  but  only  representations  within 
us,  and  consequently  it  is  not  the  movement  of  matter 
which  produces  sensation  within  us,  for  that  motion 
itself  (and  matter  also  which  makes  itself  known 
through  it)  is  representation  only.  "^  In  this  passage 
the  phenomenal  nature  of  matter  seems  to  be  put  for- 
ward as  the  reason  for  denying  to  it  the  ability  to  cause 
sensation.  "Now  we  may  as  well  admit  that  some- 
thing which,  taken  transcendentally,  is  outside  us,  may 
be  the  cause  of  our  external  perceptions,  but  this  can 

1  Werke  III,  p.  160 

2  cf .  Werke  III,  pp.  56,  347  and  others. 

3  Werke  III,  pp.  5S,  59.  112,  122. 
*  Werke  III,  pp.  608-609. 

31 


never  be  the  object  which  we  mean  by  the  representa- 
tions of  matter  and  material  things,  for  these  are 
phenomena  only  etc."^ 

If  the  above  two  quotations  are  not  explicit  enough 
on  this  point,  here  is  one  in  which  Kant  states  explicit- 
ly that  an  affection  through  phenomena  cannot  take 
place,  that  no  one  would  ever  think  of  maintaining 
such  a  doctrine.  Kant  is  here  discussing  various 
theories  of  the  dogmatic  philosophers  with  reference  to 
the  association  between  soul  and  matter,  mind  and 
body.  One  of  these  theories  is  that  of  "physical  influ- 
ence," to  which  the  other  theories  raise  the  objection 
"that  what  appears  as  matter  cannot  by  its  immediate 
influence  be  the  cause  of  representations,  these  being  a 
totally  heterogeneous  class  of  effects.  Those  who  start 
this  objection  cannot  understand  by  the  objects  of  the 
external  senses  matter  conceived  as  phenomenon  only, 
and  therefore  itself  a  mere  representation  produced  by 
whatever  external  objects.  For  -in  that  case  they 
would  really  say  that  the  representations  of  external 
objects  i.  e.  phenomena  cannot  be  the  external  causes 
of  the  representations  in  our  minds,  which  would  be  a 
meaningless  objection,  for  nobody  ivould  think  of  taking 
for  an  external  cause  ivhat  he  knows  to  he  a  mere 
representation.  "^ 

I  hope  that  I  have  now  shown,  by  means  of  these 
quotations,  that  Kant  never  intended  to  imply  a 
"phenomenal  affection"  of  sensibility.  If  he  had,  he 
would,  on  his  principles,  have  removed  our  knowledge 
one  step  farther  from  reality  than  he  pretended  to  do. 
For  if  phenomena  affect  sense,  that  affection  also  must 
be  subject  to  the  peculiar  conditions  of  the  subject 
affected,  the  qualities  of  the  phenomenon  cannot  pass 
over  into  my  presentative  faculty,  and  all  our  know- 
ledge must  necessarily  be  confined  to  representations  of 
representations,  appearances  of  appearances,  not 
appearances  of  things. 

Having  shown  that  the  phenomenon  is  not  that 
which  affects  sensibility  so  as  to  produce  sensation,  but 
is  rather  the  product  of  that  affection,  let  us  now  mrn 
to  the  other  aspect  of  our  contention  and  see  what  evi- 
dence we  can  find  for  the  view  that  Kant  regarded  the 
'thing  in  itself  as  the  cause  of  sensations. 

I  Werke  HI,  p.  600. 

^  Werke  HI,  pp.  610-611.     ' 

32 


Let  it  be  understood  at  the  outset  that  by  cause  in 
this  connection  is  not  meant  the  same  as  phenomenal  or 
material  cause.  The  more  common  expression  of  Kant 
is  ''ground  of  SQnsation  or  phenomenon."  Kant  never 
reasons  to  the  existence  of  the  'thing  in  itself  as  the 
non-phenomenal  ground  of  sensation  by  means  of  the  ar- 
gument from  effect  to  cause.  The  reasons  he  has  for 
postulating  a  non-phenomenal  world  are  practical  rather 
than  theoretical  and  it  is  not  the  place  to  discuss  them 
here.  We  mention  this  to  avoid  misunderstanding. 
We  do  not  attempt  either  to  criticise  or  to  justify 
Kant  for  his  double  use  of  the  term  cause,  but  only 
wish  to  point  out  that  he  does  use  the  term  in  two  very 
different  significations,  one  phenomenal  or  temporal, 
the  other  noumenal.  Put  in  a  few  words  we  conceive 
Kant's  standpoint  to  be  as  follows:  If  on  other  than 
speculative  or  theoretical  grounds  we  see  fit  to  assert 
that  there  is  a  non-phenomenal  cause  of  our  ideas  which 
we  may  call  the  'transcendental  object'  or  'thing  in  it- 
self,'  then  our  opponent  can  only  object  "that  the  un- 
known object  of  our  senses  cannot  be  the  cause  of  our 
ideas  and  this  he  has  no  right  to  do,  because  no  one  is 
able  to  determine  what  an  unknown  object  may  or  may 
not  be  able  to  effect.  "^  Some  of  the  passages  already 
quoted  indicate  this  point  of  view  pretty  clearly.  Here 
are  others:  "As  all  phenomena  not  being  things  in  them- 
selves, must  have  for  their  foundation  a  transcendental 
object,  determining  them  as  mere  representations,  there 
is  nothing  to  prevent  us  from  attributing  to  that  tran- 
scendental object .  .  .  a  causality  which  is  ?io^  p/ienom- 
enal,  although  its  effect  appears  in  the  phenomenon.  "^ 

The  faculty  of  sensuous  perception  is  really  some 
kind  of  receptivity  only  ....  "The  non-sensuous 
cause  of  our  representations  is  entirely  unknown  to  us. 
We  may,  however,  call  that  purely  intelligible  cause 
of  phenomena  in  general,  the  transcendental  object,  in 
order  that  we  may  have  something  which  corresponds 
to  sensibility  as  a  kind  of  receptivity. '  '^ 

Many  such  passages  might  he  cited  to  show  that 
Kant,  regarding  sensibility  as  passive  and  receptive, 
postulates  for  some  reason  or  other  a  transcendental 
object  which  by  affection  of  sensibility  produces  sensa- 
tion in  us,  while  itself  remaining  absolutely  unknow- 


S 


1  Werke  III,  pp.  611-612.  cf.  pp.  606-607. 

2  Werke  III,  p.  374. 

3  Werke  III,  p.  349. 

33 


able.  With  all  this  nothing  is  said  or  can  be  said  as  to 
its  nature,  or  whether  it  lies  within  or  without  us.  "It 
might  be  possible  that  that  something  which  forms  the 
foundation  of  external  phenomena,  and  which  so  affects 
our  sense  as  to  produce  in  it  the  representations  of  space, 
matter,  shape,  etc.,  if  considered  as  a  noumenon  (or 
better  as  a  transcendental  object)  might  be  at  the  same 
time  the  subject  of  thinking  etc.  "^ 

Section  IV. —It  is  hoped  that  the  way  is  now  clear- 
ed for  the  enquiries  that  follow  in  this  chapter  and  the 
following  one.  For  having  shown  that  the  'thing  in 
itself  gives  us  the  raw  material  of  knowledge,  in  the 
sensations  which  it  produces  within  us,  we  have  only  to 
enquire  what  part  sensation  as  such  plays  in  the  forma- 
tion of  our  experience.  What  is  involved  in  sensation 
when  we  abstract  from  it  all  that  is  imparted  to  it  by 
the  activity  of  the  mind?  I  think  there  will  be  little 
danger  in  answering  in  a  general  way  that  Kant  looks 
upon  sensation  as  a  chaotic  manifold.  "It  is  clear  that 
it  cannot  be  sensation  again  through  which  sensations 
are  arranged  and  placed  in  certain  forms.  "^ 

The  point  of  view  from  which  the  whole  of  Kant's 
Transcendental  Philosophy  arises  is  the  one  we  have 
just  indicated,  viz,  that  without  the  contribution  of  the 
mind,  in  the  form  of  space,  time  and  the  categories, 
no  experience  such  as  ours  would  be  possible.  The 
order  and  regularity  present  in  experience  is  imparted 
to  it  by  the  mind.  "In  a  phenomenon  I  call  that  which 
corresponds  to  sensation  its  matter;  but  that  which 
brings  it  about  that  the  manifold  of  the  phenomenon 
can  be  arranged  in  certain  relations,  I  call  the  form  of 
the  phenomenon,"  and  this  form  must  come  from  the 
mind.^ 

From  statements  such  as  the  above  we  are  led  to 
expect  that  Kant  will  attribute  all  the  various  forms  of 
phenomena  to  the  activity  of  the  mind.  Sensation 
should  contribute  nothing  but  the  bare  material,  the 
whole  construction  of  phenomena  from  this  material 
should  be  brought  about  through  the  mediation  of 
mental  laws. 

Confining  ourselves  in  this  chapter  to  a  considera- 
tion of  the  qualities  of  objects  regarded  as  individuals 
and  without  reference  to  their  relations  to  others,  we 

1  Werke  III,  p.  592. 

2  Werke  III,  p.  56. 

3  Werke  III,  p.  56.     Cf.  Werke  III  pp.  567,  570,  579,  580,  etc, 

34 


turn  our  attention  to  one  special  question:  what  has  the 
'thing  in  itself,  i.  e.  sensation,  to  do  with  the  determina- 
tion of  the  spatial  relations  of  objects?  For  all  the 
primary  qualities  are  bound  up  with  space. 

As  regards  space  in  general,  it  seems  clear  from 
what  we  learned  in  the  first  part  of  this  chapter,  that 
sensation  as  such  has  no  spatial  attributes;  that  space 
is  but  a  form  imparted  to  sensations  by  an  intelligence 
which  has  this  peculiar  way  of  bringing  order  into  the 
chaos  of  its  sensuous  states.  Kant  does  not  deny  that 
our  notion  of  space,  like  other  notions,  only  becomes 
clear  and  definite  through  experience;  but  that  view  he 
claims  is  quite  in  accord  with  his  theory  that  space  as 
a  form  of  perception  renders  experience  possible.  By 
experience  here  is  not  meant  sensation  but  the  product 
of  sensation  and  thought.  So  through  reflexion  upon 
experience  we  just  become  more  clearly  conscious  of 
what  we  have  imparted  to  it  ourselves,  ^ 

In  what  we  have  said  on  space  in  general  or  the 
quality  of  extension  in  objects  there  seems  little  that 
any  interpreter  of  Kant  would  be  inclined  to  deny. 
Exponents  of  Kant's  views  are  not  so  well  agreed, 
however,  concerning  what  they  think  Kant  would 
say  in  answer  to  our  further  question,— what  about  the 
particular  spatial  determinations  of  objects?  Why  do 
I  perceive  one  object  as  round,  another  square,  a  third 
triangular  and  so  on?  Is  this  variety  in  the  spatial 
determinations  of  objects  due  to  something  inherent  in 
the  sensations  themselves?  Or  is  this,  too,  to  be  attrib- 
uted to  the  productivity  of  the  ego? 

Herbart  and  others^  have  attacked  Kant's  theory 
of  space  because,  as  they  thought,  such  questions  as 
we  have  just  indicated  are  unanswerable  from  his  point 
of  view.  We  must  confess  that  Kant  himself  makes 
no  explicit  statements  in  regard  to  the  matter,  but  we 
have  his  general  theory  of  knowledge  before  us  and  it 
is  fair,  I  think,  that  we  should  investigate  that 
thoroughly  and  not  pronounce  such  questions  as  alien 
to  his  philosophy  until  we  have  discovered  the  implica- 
tions of  his  epistemology  as  a  whole.  If  even  then  no 
answer  is  forthcoming  to  our  enquiry  we  may  join  in 
the  attack  with  Herbart  and  proclaim  Kant's  theory  as 
inadequate  and  as  failing  to  account    for  facts.     To  be- 

i  Cf.  Werke  III  pp.  191,  582  etc. 

2  Vaihinger,  Comment,  zur.  Kr.  d.  r.  V.  Vol.  II  p.  180. 

35 


gin  with  there  can  be  only  two  possible  answers  from 
Kant's  point  of  view— either  the  sensation  gives  the 
cue  to  the  mind  in  indication  of  the  particular  construc- 
tion to  be  carried  out,  or  the  variety  in  spatial  forms  is 
due  entirely  to  the  productivity  of  the  ego.  Our  aim  is 
simply  to  interpret  Kant  in  this  connection,  not  to  dis- 
cuss the  question  of  Empiricism  vs.  Transcendentalism. 
And  if  we  can  show  that  Kant  meant  to  attribute 
to  mind  itself  the  construction  of  all  figures  without 
any  cue  from  the  sensations  as  such;  or  on  the  other 
hand  that  he  regarded  sensation  as  the  determining 
factor  in  such  constructions,  in  either  case  our  aim 
has  been  accomplished  and  our  work  on  this  chapter  is 
finished. 

Among  the  immediate  successors  of  Kant,  Mellin,^ 
Reinhold,^  and  Schulze^  seem  to  favor  that  interpreta- 
tion of  Kant  which  v/ould  ascribe  to  sensation  the  de- 
termining factor  in  all  knowledge,  and  among  moderns 
Liebmann^  and  Riehl.^  But  since  Riehl  considers  these 
questions  in  regard  to  space  pretty  fully,  and  his  works 
are  easiest  of  access,  we  shall  confine  ourselves  here  to 
his  interpretation  and  arguments  as  typical  of  that  side. 

Riehl  is  in  general  concerned  to  make  Kant's 
philosophy  agree  with  the  results  of  the  empirical 
sciences,  and  will  have  Kant  trace  particular  rela- 
tions of  objects  in  all  cases  to  sensation. ^  In  support 
of  this  view  Riehl  goes  back  to  the  Dissertation  and 
quotes  the  following  sentence  as  positive  proof  in 
that  connection:  "In  order  that  the  manifold  of  the 
object  of  sense  may  grow  into  a  u'hole  of  representa- 
tion there  is  needed  an  inner  principle  of  consciousness 
in  conformity  to  which  that  manifold  takes  on  a  certain 
form  (space  and  time)  in  a  definite  regidar  way."'' 
Now  it  seems  to  me  that  such  a  passage  could  quite  as 
well  be  interpreted  in  favour  of  the  opposite  view.  In 
fact  it  would  seem  more  reasonable  to  urge  that  the 
emphasis  of  this  sentence  is  to  be  laid  more  upon  the 
need  of  an  "inner  principle  of  consciousness"  than  on 
the  variety  in  the  object.  As  in  agreement  with  the 
above  passage  from  the  Dissertation,  Riehl  refers  to  the 


1  Of.  Vaihinger,  Comment,     z.  Kr.  d.  r.  V.  II  pp.  180-184. 
z  Th.  d.  Vorst.  pp.  299  ff. 
3  Kr.  d.  th.  Phil.  II  192. 
*  Obj.  Aubl.  p.  153. 

5  Phil.  Krit,  many  passages.     See  following  pages. 

e  See  Riehl,  Philos.     Kriticismus,  Vol.  I  pp.  279,  305,  306,  352  etc  &  Vol  11  pp.  33, 
90  etc. 

^  Werke  II  p.  400  (§  4  of  Diss.).     Riehl,  Phil.  Krit.  I  p.  279. 

36 


statement  in  the  Critique  that  '  'the  infinite  manif old- 
ness  of  phenomena  cannot  be  sufficiently  comprehend- 
ed through  the  pure  form  of  senuous  perception."^ 

What  connection  this  passage  can  have  with  the 
one  in  the  Dissertation  is  not  easily  seen,  but  like  that, 
it  fails  to  convince  me  that  Riehl's  interpretation  of 
Kant  is  necessarily  the  true  one.  Most  assuredly  the 
pure  form  of  perception  cannot  supply  all  that  is  needed 
to  a  comprehension  of  the  manifoldness  of  phenomena, 
for  that  manifoldness  may  refer  to  colour,  smell  etc., 
all  the  secondary  qualities.  But  even  if  it  refers  to  the 
variety  in  spatial  relations,  does  Kant  thereby  hand  the 
function  of  constructing  these  forms  over  to  sensation? 
By  no  means.  Kant  might  answer  that  in  addition  to 
space  as  a  form  of  perception  some  further  mental 
activity  must  be  called  into  play  before  such  construc- 
tion could  take  place  ;2  that  space  itself  as  we  know  it 
involves  the  action  of  the  categories  of  the  understand- 
ing. But  with  all  this  Kant  attributes  no  farther  func- 
tion to  sensation  than  that  of  supplying  the  raw  material 
for  knowledge.     All  form  must  come  from  the  mind. 

But  let  us  continue  with  Riehl's  quotations.  The 
following  may  be  taken  as  the  most  important  ones  for 
his  view,  as  in  fact  almost  the  only  passages  in  the 
Critique  that  seem  to  favour  such  an  interpretation: 
"Although  therefore  things  as  phenomenal  may  deter- 
mine space  i.  e.  among  all  possible  predicates  (Quantity 
and  Relation)  impart  reality  to  this  or  that  one,  yet 
space  as  something  existing  by  itself,  cannot  determine 
the  reality  of  things  in  regard  to  quantity  or  shape,  be- 
cause it  is  nothing  real  in  itself.  "^  In  this  case  Kant's 
argument  is  directed  against  the  view  that  empty  space 
exists  as  a  thing  independent  of  phenomena,  and  re- 
marks, as  we  have  noted,  that  "things  as  phenomenal 
determine  space. ' '  But  how  are  things  as  phenomena 
constructed  so  far  as  their  spatial  determinations  are 
concerned?  That  is  the  question  to  which  we  seek  an 
answer,  and  so  far  as  an  answer  to  it  is  concerned  the 
quotation  seems  wide  of  the  point.  To  attribute  a  cer- 
tain function  to  phenomena,  to  experience  as  developed 
by  means  of  the  forms  of  perception  and  the  categories 
of  the  understanding,  is  very  different  from  ascribing 
that  function  to  sensation  as  such.     The  passage  taken 

1  Werke  III,  p.  583-4. 

^  Cf.  Werke  III  pp.  119,  126,  127. 

3  Werke  III,  p.  309. 

37 


in  its  proper  connection  will  not  bear  Riehl's  interpre- 
tation. 

It  is  the  same  with  this  one  also:  "This  law  of  re- 
production (association  of  ideas),  however,  presupposes 
that  the  phenomena  themselves  are  really  subject  to  such 
a  rule,  and  that  there  is  in  the  variety  of  these  repre- 
sentations a  sequency  and  concomitancy  subject  to 
certain  rules;  for  without  this  the  faculty  of  empirical 
imagination  would  never  find  anything  to  do  that  it  is 
able  to  do,  and  would  therefore  lie  buried  within  our 
mind  as  a  dead  faculty  unknown  to  ourselves.  If  cin- 
nabar were  sometimes  red  and  sometimes  black,  some- 
times light  and  sometimes  heavy,  if  a  man  could  be 
changed  now  into  this  now  into  another  animal  shape, 

the  faculty  of  my  empirical  imagination  would 

never  be  in  a  position  when  representing  red  colour  to 
think  of  heavy  cinnabar.  "^  There  must  be  a  rule  of 
synthesis  in  the  phenomena  themselves,  says  Kant. 
Riehl  interprets  this  as  an  admission  on  Kant's  part 
that  a  rule  is  present  in  sensation  as  such,  that  things 
determine  our  representations  of  them  so  far  as  all 
particularity  is  concerned. 

Now  we  know  that  Kant's  general  view  is  that  the 
representation  determines  the  thing  not  vice  versa. 
Does  the  above  passage  contradict  it?  Let  us  have 
Kant's  own  conclusions  from  the  same  statement,  as  he 
gives  them  in  the  following  paragraph:  'There  must 
therefore,  be  something  to  make  this  reproduction  of 
phenomena  possible  by  being  itself  the  foundation  a 
priori  of  a  necessary  synthetical  unity  of  them. '  '^  Since 
all  phenomena  are  but  representations  Kant  argues  that 
this  is  quite  possible  and  concludes:  "We  must  admit  a 
pure  transcendental  synthesis  of  imagination  which 
alone  forms  the  foundation  of  the  possibility  of  all  ex- 
perience, such  experience  being  impossible  without  the 
reproductibility  of  phenomena. ' ' 

Riehl,  as  we  have  seen,  quotes  the  above  passage 
to  show  that  Kant  finds  certain  connections  in  experi- 
ence; Kant  himself  mentions  these  connections  in  order 
to  ask,  how  are  they  possible?  And  what  is  his  answer? 
Not  that  they  have  their  origin  in  sensation,  but  these 
very  connections,  Kant  argues,  prove  that  there  must 
have  been  at  work  a  synthetic  activity  in  the  construc- 
tion of   experience,    since  sensation    could  not  of  itself 

1  Werke  III  pp.  568-569;  Riehl,  Phil.  Krit.  I,  418,  note. 

2  Werke  III  p.  569. 

38 


supply  the  connection.  As  he  says  in  another  place, 
'  'the  connection  of  a  manifold  in  general  can  never 
come  to  us  through  the  senses,"  for  ''this  is  an  act  of 
the  spontaneity  of  the  faculty  of  ideation.  "^ 

The  result  then  of  our  review  of  Riehl's  interpre- 
tation is  this.  Some  of  the  quotations  which  he  makes 
have  no  bearing  upon  the  point  at  issue;  others  can  as 
well  be  taken  to  favour  the  exactly  opposite  view; 
while  in  others  still  Kant  is  explicitly  pleading  that  a 
synthetic  activity  of  mind  is  needed  to  render  possible 
a  connected  experience  of  objects,  since  sensation  as 
such  can  only  give  us  a  manifold  which  has  no  connec- 
tions. This  connectedness  of  phenomena  is  a  result  of 
what  Kant  calls  "a  pure  transcendental  synthesis  of 
imagination,"  in  the  passage  last  quoted.  "This  is  a 
blind  but  indispensable  function  of  the  soul,  without 
which  we  should  have  no  knowledge  whatsoever,  but  of 
the  existance  of  which  we  are  scarcely  conscious.  "^ 

Section  5.  Having  so  far  found  no  reason  to  at- 
tribute to  sensation  any  function  so  far  as  the  form  of 
our  experience  is  concerned,  let  us  enquire  whether 
Kant  tells  us  anything  that  would  lead  us  to  infer  that 
he  has  any  theory  as  regards  the  formation  of  particular 
forms  of  objects.  From  what  we  have  already  seen, 
we  may  expect  to  find  such  a  theory,  if  at  all,  in  Kant's 
doctrine  of  productive  imagination.  We  have  already 
learned  from  Kant  that  the  pure  form  of  perception 
alone  cannot  give  us  the  variety  to  be  found  in  the 
forms  of  perceived  objects.  We  have  shown  further 
that,  on  Kant's  principles,  no  element  of  form  can  re- 
side in  the  sensations  themselves,  and  that  no  state- 
ments of  Kant  when  taken  in  their  proper  connections 
can  be  construed  to  indicate  a  theory  which  would  con- 
tradict this  fundamental  position.  We  shall  now  inves- 
tigate his  theory  of  imaginative  synthesis  to  see  whether 
there  is  involved  in  it  anything  that  would  lead  us  to 
interpret  Kant  as  attributing  the  formation  of  particular 
space  forms  to  that  source.  If  such  implications  can  be 
discovered  in  Kant's  general  theory  of  the  function  of 
Productive  Imagination,  it  will  then  be  our  duty  to 
ransack  the  pages  of  the  Critique  in  search  of  particular 
statements  in  confirmation  of  such  an  interpretation. 
The  prominent  place  given  to  imagination  by  Kant  in 
the  construction  of  phenomena  justifies  us  in  devoting 

1  Werke  III  p.  114  §  15  of  Trans.  Ded.  in  2nd  Edition. 

2  Werke  III  p.  99. 

39 


some  space  at  this  juncture  to  an  exposition  of  its  func- 
tions; since  this  will  be  found  of  great  importance,  not 
only  with  reference  to  the  immediate  questions  of  this 
chapter,  but  when  we  come  to  deal  with  the  categories 
of  the  understanding  as  well. 

In  the  opening  sections  of  the  Critique  we  hear  only 
of  Sensibility  and  Understanding  as  the  two  sources  of 
all  our  knowledge,  the  "two  fundamental  sources  of  our 
soul."^  Now  however,  as  Kant  proceeds  in  his  task  of 
explaining  what  is  involved  in  knowledge,  we  are  in- 
troduced to  a  third  faculty  which  shall  form  a  connect- 
ing link  between  the  other  two.^  Its  business,  called 
synthesis,  is  to  connect  the  manifold  given  in  space 
and  time.  This  is  the  work  of  what  Kant  calls  the 
faculty  of  Imagination.  2  If  the  manifold  to  be  connect- 
ed is  given  in  experience  the  synthesis  is  empirical;  it 
is  pure  if  the  manifold  is  given  a  priori.'^  This  latter 
kind  of  synthesis  is  also  called  "Transcendental." 

Further,  this  business  of  the  imagination  is  con- 
ducted according  to  rules,  these  rules  being  the  twelve 
categories  according  to  which  the  understanding  is  also 
supposed  to  work.^  And  in  still  another  respect  these 
two  faculties  agree.  As  we  have  already  noticed,  syn- 
thesis is  the  work  of  imagination.  But  in  another  place 
we  are  told  that  all  connection,  all  synthesis  must  be 
attributed  to  the  understanding  alone.  *^  Why  then  has 
this  new  faculty,  the  imagination,  been  introduced  at 
all  if  it  is  only  to  do  over  again  that  which  has  been 
already  done  by  the  understanding?  This  brings  us  to 
consider  the  relationship  which  these  two  faculties  bear 
to  each  other. 

The  solution  of  the  apparent  com  radiction  in  Kant's 
statements  is  that  the  imagination  is  just  the  under- 
standing working  unconsciously."^  There  is  thus  a 
double  synthesis  of  the  understanding— the  conscious 
synthesis  whose  products  are  concepts  and  judgments, 
which  may  be  called  in  the  strict  sense  the  synthesis  of 
the  understanding;  and  the  unconscious  synthesis  of  the 
imagination  whose  products  are  represented  to  us  in 
perceptual  forms. 


1  Werke  III  p.  81  cf.  pp.  52,  82. 

*  Cf.  Werke  III  pp.  127,  141  ff.  and  582. 

*  Werke  III  p.  99  and  elsewhere. 

4  Werke  III,  99,  127. 

5  Werke  III  p.    133. 

6  Werke  III  p.  114,  115. 

7  Werke  III  pp.  133,  569  etc. 

40 


This  relationship  between  these  two  faculties  was 
apparent  on  the  first  mention  of  imagination  where  it 
was  said:  "We  shall  see  hereafter  that  synthesis  in 
general  is  the  mere  result  of  what  I  call  the  faculty  of 
imagination,  a  blind  but  indispensable  function  of  the 
soul,  without  which  we  should  have  no  knowledge 
whatsoever,  but  of  the  existence  of  v/hich  we  are  scarce- 
ly conscious.  But  to  reduce  this  synthesis  to  coyicepts  is 
a  function  that  belongs  to  the  imdey'standing ,  and  by 
which  the  understanding  supplies  us  for  the  first  time 
with  knowledge  properly  so  called."^  This  is  further 
confirmed  in  the  second  edition  of  the  Critique  where 
Kant  distinguishes  the  figurative  from  the  intellectual 
synthesis;-  as  also  at  the  conclusion  of  the  Transcen- 
dental Deduction  of  the  Categories  in  the  1st  edition: 
"It  is  this  apperception  which  must  be  added  to  pure 
imaginationinorder  to  render  its  function  intelligible,"^ 
when  taken  along  with  the  words  in  a  preceding  para- 
graph: "The  unity  of  apperception  with  reference  to 
the  synthesis  of  imagination  is  the  understanding."* 
Thus  the  understanding  just  brings  to  logical  clearness 
in  consciousness  the  results  of  what  it  has  itself  done 
blindly  and  unconsciously  under  the  name  of  imagina- 
tion. 

A  great  deal  of  confusion  is  caused  by  Kant's  not 
always  keeping  these  two  aspects  of  the  understanding 
distinct.  At  one  time  be  attributes  to  understanding 
what  at  another  is  reckoned  among  the  functions  of  im- 
agination. This  confusion  is  rendered  still  worse  by 
the  introduction  of  a  cross— distinction  also.  The  imag- 
ination, we  are  told,  is  always  employed  on  sensuous 
material.  Its  synthesis  is  accordingly,  as  noticed  above, 
c?L\\ed  figurative,  "in  order  to  distinguish  it  from  that 
which  is  thought  in  the  mere  category,"  i.  e.  the  intel- 
lectual synthesis,  "which  takes  place  by  the  understand- 
ing only,  without  the  aid  of  the  faculty  of  imagina- 
tion. "^ 

This  intellectual  synthesis  does  not  seem  very  im- 
portant for  Kant's  theory  of  knowledge,  since  such  a 
synthesis,  independent  of  all  perception  can  have  no 
meaning.  In  order  to  impart  meaning  to  synthesis,  the 
sensuous  element  must  always  be  present.     Thus  what- 

1  Werke  III,  p.  99. 

2  Werke  III,  pp.  126,  127. 

3  Werke  III,  p.  581. 

4  Werke  III.  p.  578. 

5  Werke  III,  p.  127.     cf .  also  p.  581. 

41 


ever  synthesis  is  involved  in  experience  must  be  direct- 
ed to  sensuous  material;  and  we  can  in  general  say  that 
this  synthesis  belongs  to  the  imagination  if  unconscious, 
if  conscious  to  the  understanding  in  the  narrower  sense. 
Understanding  is  often  used  as  the  generic  term  to 
cover  both  conscious  and  unconscious  synthesis.  It  is 
not  our  purpose  to  give  a  full  discussion  here  of  all  the 
a  priori  functions  of  knowledge  of  which  Kant  spoke, 
and  we  shall  accordingly  confine  ourselves  to  the  broad 
distinction  just  referred  to  between  imagination  and 
understanding.  Along  with  that,  however,  it  must  be 
always  borne  in  mind,  as  we  have  already  pointed 
out,  that  the  laws  by  which  they  work  are  the  same, 
those  laws  being  expressed  in  the  table  of  the  twelve 
categories. 

One  further  distinction,  however,  is  of  importance 
for  the  proper  understanding  of  Kant's  Epistemology, 
viz,  that  between  Productive  and  Reproductive  Imagin- 
ation.' That  distinction  has  already  been  implicitly 
made  in  the  course  of  our  remarks  on  this  subject,  since 
it  rests  on  the  difference  in  the  material  upon  which  the 
synthesis  is  carried  out.  The  reproductive  imagination 
works  upon  material  provided  from  elsewhere  than  from 
the  subject  itself  i.  e.  upon  sensations  as  given  in  space 
and  time.  It  is  thus  just  the  same  as  empirical  synthe- 
sis; and  as  it  is  inseparably  connected  with  apprehen- 
sion, the  synthesis  of  imagination  is  not  always  distin- 
guished from  that  of  apprehension.  ^ 

From  this  is  to  be  distinguished  the  productive, 
which  is  pure,  a  priori,  trancendental.  Here  not  only 
are  the  rules  by  which  the  synthesis  is  carried  out,  a 
priori,  given  independently  of  experience,  but  also  the 
material  to  be  synthesized.  This  material  is  supposed 
to  be  something  given  through  our  own  self  activity;  it 
is  constructed  by  ourselves  also  by  means  of  this  faculty 
of  productive  imagination.  As  to  what  this  given  non- 
empirical  material  may  be  Kant  never  gives  an  explicit 
answer,  but  he  always  seems  to  have  in  mind  a  mani- 
fold of  forms  and  relations  given  in  potentiality  in  space 
and  time  as  pure  perceptions.  In  this  way  all  the  func- 
tions of  imagination  which  are  required  to  work  upon 
the  given  manifold  of  sensations  in  expereence  in  order 
to  construct  out  of  them  our  world  of  perception,  may 
also  be  carried  out  a  priori  upon  the  inner  materials 

1  cf.  Werke  III.  pp.  569.  99.  127  and  others. 
^  Werke  III,  pp.  132,  133  with  note,  567-569. 

42 


given  in  the  pure  forms  of  space  and  time.  The  ego 
then  is  supposed  to  construct  a  world  of  forms  and  fig- 
ures quite  out  of  its  own  resources. 

Kant  apparently  does  not  mean  to  imply  that  all 
this  work  of  the  productive  imagination  can  be  carried 
out  before  the  senses  are  affected  by  objects  at  all  i.  e. 
before  all  experience.  Rather  he  always  finds  the  pro- 
ductive imagination  presupposed  in  the  activity  of  the 
reproductive.  They  are  not  two  different  faculties,  but 
two  sides  of  the  same  process;  and  since  the  reproduct- 
ive presupposes  the  a  priori  and  productive,  the  latter 
is  also  called  transcendental.  ^  This  productive  synthe- 
sis of  imagination,  this  free  construction  of  space  and 
time  relations,  brings  about  what  Kant  calls  the  affinity 
of  phenomena,  in  that,  in  the  above  mentioned  schem- 
atism the  outlines  are  given  according  to  which  the 
empirical  synthesis  of  im.agination  m.ust  proceed  in  its 
construction  of  shapes  and  figures  in  sensuous  percep- 
tion. With  his  theory  of  the  productive  imagination  as 
presupposed  in  the  reproductive,  and  of  both  as  work- 
ing according  to  the  categories  and  under  the  conditions 
of  space  and  time,  Kant  seems  to  think  that  he  has 
rendered  possible  a  reconciliation  of  his  opposed  state- 
ments, — '  'space  and  time  as  forms  of  preception  deter- 
mine phenomena,"  and  "phenomena  determine  space 
and  time." 

How  Kant  can  reconcile  these  views,  how  he  can 
speak  of  all  this  a  priori  activity  and  yet  hold  that  the 
impulse  to  all  our  knowledge  comes  with  sensation,  ^  we 
do  not  propose  to  discuss;  for  as  we  remarked  above,  we 
are  not  putting  Kant  on  trial  for  his  Transcendentalism. 
We  only  interpret.  We  simply  wish  to  point  out  that 
Kant  does  hold  to  an  a  priori,  trancendental  synthesis 
of  imagination  which  works  upon  an  original  manifold 
given  in  pure  perception,  and  that  he  makes  this  pro- 
cess the  condition  of  the  empirical  reproductive  synthe- 
sis of  ordinary  association.^ 

For  our  purpose  it  is  particularly  worthy  of  note 
that  Kant  speaks  of  the  productive  imagination  as  the 
faculty  which  produces  pictures,  makes  definite  percep- 
tions out  of  a  manifold  of  single  impressions.  One  of- 
ten meets  with  such  expressions  as  the  following:  "The 
figures  which  productive  imagination  traces  in  space.  "^ 

1  Werke  III,  p. 

2  Werke  III,  pp.  107-108. 

3  cf.  Werke  III  pp.  127,  569.  581. 
*  Werke  III,  p.  152. 

43 


"On  the  suceessive  synthesis  of  productive  imagination 
in  producing  figures  are  founded  the  mathematics  of 
extension."^  "If  I  say  that  a  triangle  may  be  con- 
structed with  three  fines  etc I  have  before  me 

the  mere  function  of  productive  imagination.  "^  "Mo- 
tion, considered  as  describing  a  space, —is  a  pure  act  of 
the  successive  synthesis  of  the  manifold  in  external  per- 
ception in  general  by  means  of  productive  imagination, 
and  belongs  therefore  by  right to  transcenden- 
tal philosophy."^ 

When  we  learn  that  the  productive  imagination  has 
such  an  elaborate  programme  of  synthesis,  that,  out  of 
the  "original  manifold  of  pure  perception"  it  works  up 
a  variety  of  spatial  figures,  and  that  in  doing  all  this  it 
is  the  condition  of  the  possibility  of  all  our  sensuous 
knowledge,  is  it  unreasonable  to  expect  an  answer  here  to 
our  question,— whence  the  particular  figures  in  space? 
If  the  productive  imagination  is  that  faculty  which  pro- 
duces figures  in  space,  and  if  such  a  faculty  works  a 
priori  upon  an  original  manifold,  then  why  hesitate  to 
attribute  to  it  the  function  of  determining  why  an 
object  shall  appear  in  one  shape  rather  than  another? 

It  could  certainly  not  be  expected  that  our  question 
should  be  answered  fully  in  the  Aesthetic;  since,  as  we 
learn  when  Kant  deals  with  the  Transcendental  Deduc- 
tion of  the  Categories,  space  itself  is  not  possible  as  a 
clear  and  definite  motion  but  for  the  action  of  the  Cate- 
gories.^ 

We  must  look  to  the  Analytic  for  an  answer,  since, 
as  Cohen^  says,  the  synthesis  of  the  object  alone  enables 
us  to  recognize  a  determinate  space.  "^  So  far,  however, 
as  Kant  does  say  anything  on  this  point  in  the  Aesthetic 
it  seems  to  favour  an  interpretation  which  attributes 
the  chief  function  in  knowledge  to  mental  activity. 
After  taking  away  all  the  contributions  of  pure  thought 
and  sensation  from  the  object,  Kant  finds  left  extension 
and  s/mpe  as  forms  ready  in  the  mind.'^ 

But  coming  to  the  Transcendental  Deduction  we 
find  this  statement  from  Kant:  "In  order  to  know  any- 
thing in  space,  for  instance  a  line,  I  must  draw  it  and 


1  Werke  III.  p.  157. 

*  WerkeHI,  p.  157. 
3  Werke  III,  p.  128. 

*  Werke  III,  p.  132. 

5  Theorie  d.  Erfahrung  2d  Ed.  pp.  322  ff. 

6  Cf.  Werke  III  p.  119. 

7  Werke  III  p.  56.     Cf.  p.  74. 

44 


produce  synthetically  a  certain  connection  of  the  mani- 
fold that  is  given,  so  that  the  unity  of  that  act  is  at  the 
same  time  the  unity  of  the  consciousness  (in  the  con- 
cept of  a  line)  and  is  thus  only  known  for  the  first  time 
as  an  object  (a  determinate  space)  ".^  Now  the  unity 
of  consciousness  expresses  itself  in  the  Categories;  and 
since  they  are,  according  to  the  above  passage,  neces- 
sary in  order  to  know  a  determinate  space,  the  answer 
to  our  question  must  involve  an  answer  to  the  inquiry 
of  the  next  chapter,  — '  'Does  the  senstation  determine 
the  use  of  the  Categories?"  This  result  is  what  we 
might  expect  if  the  imagination  has  to  discharge  the 
function  of  tracing  particular  figures  in  space,  since  we 
have  learned  that  its  activity  is  carried  on  in  accord- 
ance with  the  Categories.  2 

We  have  already  seen  that  the  synthesis  of  imagin- 
ation is  necessary  even  to  perception,  that  consequently 
the  senses  alone  cannot  give  us  perception  even,  with- 
out their  being  accompanied  by  the  functions  of  thought. 
Now  in  Section  26  of  the  Transcendental  Deduction  of 
the  Categories  in  the  2nd  Edition  of  the  Critique  this 
idea  is  still  more  clearly  enforced.  Here  we  are  told 
that  perception  would  be  impossible  without  the  action 
of  the  Categories,  and,  in  a  note,  that  space  represented 
as  an  object  (and  when  thus  represented  it  becomes  a 
determinate  space)  presupposes  a  synthesis  which  the 
senses  cannot  give.^  The  following  example  introduced 
here  by  Kant  is  of  interest  to  us:  "If,  for  instance,  I 
raise  the  empirical  perception  of  a  house,  through  the 
apprehension  of  the  manifold  contained  therein,  into  a 
sensuous  perception  ( Wahrnehmung) ,  the  necessary  unity 
of  space  and  of  external  sensuous  perception  in  general 
is  presupposed,  and  I  draw  as  it  were  the  shape  of  the 
house  according  to  that  synthetical  unity  of  the  mani- 
fold in  space.  But  this  very  synthetic  unity,  if  I  make 
abstraction  of  the  form  of  space,  has  its  seat  in  the  un- 
derstanding, and  is  in  fact  the  category  of  the  synthesis 
of  the  homogeneous  in  perception  in  general:  that  is, 
the  category  of  quantity,  to  which  that  synthesis  of 
apprehension,  i.  e.  the  perception,  must  always  con- 
form."-^ In  a  footnote  this  same  synthesis  is  spoken  of 
as  belonging  to  the  imagination. 

1  Werke  HI.  p.  119. 
^  See  pp.  40-41  above. 
3  Werke  III  pp.  131.  133. 

■•  Werke  III,  pp.  132-133.     Cf .  Werke  HI,  p.  579  note,   where   it  is  claimed  that 
imagination  is  a  necessary  ingredient  in  perception. 

45 


These  last  quotations  seem  to  indicate  that  Kant 
would  trace  the  determinate  in  spatial  relations,  as 
well  as  space  as  a  mere  form  of  perception,  to  the 
productive  activity  of  the  ego.  Kant  certainly  tells  us 
that  a  synthesis  of  the  imagination  gives  us  the  empiri- 
cal perception  in  its  determinateness;  and  since  a  pro- 
ductive imagination  is  presupposed  as  the  condition  of  a 
reproductive,  and  since  this  productive  imagination 
works  up  figures  out  of  the  manifold  given  originally 
(in  some  sense  or  other)  in  perception,  a  natural  conclu- 
sion is  that  Kant  would  ascribe  the  particular  figures  in 
space  to  the  activity  of  imagination. 

Of  course  Kant  does  not  give  an  exphcit  answer  to 
the  question,  how  this  or  that  faculty  accomplishes 
its  work,  he  does  not  give  a  history  of  particular  fig- 
ures: nor  can  he  be  called  upon  to  do  so,  since  he  is 
dealing  not  with  Psychology  but  with  Epistemology.  ^ 
Hence  he  does  not  pretend  to  bring  pictures  before  us 
in  illustration  of  the  process  by  which  the  mind  works 
up  all  the  materials  given  chaotically  in  sense  into  the 
ordered  whole  of  experience.  Kant  is  simply  concerned 
in  discovering  what  processes  are  involved  in  the  pro- 
duction of  experience;  and  one  which  he  thinks  plays  a 
very  important  part  is  the  faculty  of  productive  imagin- 
ation. We  are  of  opinion  that  in  Kant's  theory  of  this 
faculty  are  implied  his  answer  to  the  question  which 
has  chiefly  concerned  us  in  this  chapter. 


1  Cf.  Cohen.  Theorie  der  Erfahrung,  PP.  323  flf. 

46 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE  FUNCTION  OF  THE    'THING  IN  ITSELF'   IN  DETERMIN- 
ING THE    EMPLOYMENT  OF  THE  CATEGORIES 
OF  THE  UNDERSTANDING. 

Section  1.  In  the  preceding  chapter  we  enquired 
into  the  function  assigned  by  Kant  to  the  'thing  in 
itself  with  particular  reference  to  the  spatial  relations 
of  the  objects  of  experience.  In  regard  to  space  in 
general,  or  the  quality  of  extension  in  objects,  we  found 
Kant  explicit  in  his  contention  that  space  cannot  be  a 
quality  of  things  in  themselves,  that  it  cannot  even  be 
the  mind's  way  of  reading  off  a  corresponding  quality 
in  things.  It  is  rather,  Kant  thinks,  only  a  form  of 
perception  inherent  in  the  nature  of  the  mind,  which 
renders  our  experience  of  objects  in  space  possible.^ 

When,  however,  we  came  to  consider  his  views  on 
the  origin  of  particular  forms  in  space,  that  explicitness 
was  found  to  be  wanting  and  we  were  compelled  to 
seek  his  answer  in  what  seemed  to  us  to  be  the  neces- 
sary implications  of  his  theory  of  knowledge.  One  of 
the  conclusions  arrived  at  during  the  course  of  this  lat- 
ter enquiry  was  that,  on  Kant's  principles,  all  deter- 
minateness  in  the  spatial  relations  of  objects  involves 
the  activity,  not  only  of  the  form  of  perception  called 
space,  but  of  the  categories  or  concepts  of  the  under- 
standing as  well.  2  We  thus  found  ourselves  compelled 
to  rest  satisfied  with  a  partial  answer  to  our  question  in 
the  preceding  chapter  and  to  look  forward  to  a  fuller 
and  more  positive  answer  in  this.  The  results  of  this 
chapter  must  either  confirm  or  reverse  the  conclusions 
of  the  former. 

While,  however,  the  results  of  this  chapter  must  be 
looked  upon  as  the  most  important  and  decisive  for  our 
whole  enquiry,  yet  we  trust  that  some  points  have  been 
settled  already  and  that  consequently  some  important 
results  of  Chapter  II  may  be  safely  emyloyed  here  as  a 
basis  for  further  discussion.  It  the  first  place  we  have 
seen  that  the  'thing  in  itself  may  be  regarded  as  the 
cause  or  ground  of  our  sensations,^  and  that,  as  a  conse- 

1  Cf.  pp.  34  ff.  above. 

»  Cf.  pp.  91-93. 

3  Cf.  pp.  30  ff.  above.  j 

47  ' 


quence  of  this,  the  question  as  to  the  function  of  the 
'thing  in  itself  resolves  itself  into  another,  viz. :  What 
is  involved  in  sensation  as  such?  We  have  already 
sought  to  answer  this  question  for  the  spatial  relations 
of  objects  so  far  as  possible  within  the  limits  of  the 
preceding  chapter.  We  have  now  further  to  enquire 
what  is  involved  in  sensation  from  the  point  of  view  of 
the  Categories  of  the  understanding.  Do  the  Categories 
bring  order  into  the  chaos  of  sensation,  or  does  the 
sensation  give  the  cue  to  the  Categories,  i.  e.,  does  it 
contain  order  implicitly  in  itself?  Or  does  Kant,  while 
looking  upon  sensation  in  general  as  a  chaotic  manifold, 
yet  so  far  contradict  this  fundamental  position  as  to 
attribute  to  sensation  itself  the  innate  power  of  decision 
as  to  which  of  the  several  categories  shall  be  em- 
ployed in  any  particular  case? 

In  seeking  to  answer  any  or  all  of  these  questions 
we  shall  repeatedly  call  to  our  aid  other  results  of  our 
previous  discussions.  The  function  of  the  faculty  of 
productive  imagination  has  already  been  quite  fully  dis- 
cussed, and  it  has  been  found  to  be  of  great  significance 
for  Kant's  theory  of  knowledge.  It  is  the  faculty  of 
unconscious  synthesis,  and  the  rules  followed  in  that 
synthesis  are  the  categories  of  the  understanding. 
'  'However  strange,  therefore,  it  may  appear  at  first,  it 
must  nevertheless  have  become  clear  by  this  time  that 
the  affinity  of  phenomena  and  with  it  their  association, 
and  through  that,  lastly,  their  reproduction  also  accord- 
ing to  laws,  that  is  the  whole  of  our  experience,  becomes 
possible  only  by  means  of  that  transcendental  function 
of  imagination  without  which  no  concepts  of  objects 
could  ever  come  together  in  one  experience."^  This 
synthesis  of  the  imagination  does  not  yet  give  us  true 
knowledge.  Through  its  unconscious  activity  the  imag- 
ination does  bring  about  order  in  our  perceptions,  "but 
to  reduce  this  synthesis  to  concepts  is  a  function  that 
belongs  to  the  understanding  and  by  which  the  under- 
standing supplies  us  for  the  first  time  with  knowledge 
properly  so  called. '  '^  The  imagination,  therefore,  does 
blindly  and  unconsciously  what  the  understanding  does 
clearly  and  consciously. 

Furthermore,  the  imagination  is  active  in  percep- 


1  Werke  III  p.  581. 

2  Werke  111  p.  99.    Cf.  pp.  40  ff.  of  this  thesis. 

48 


tion  itself;  we  could  not  even  have  perception  without 
the  synthesizing  power  of  productive  imagination.  And 
since  this  faculty  works  according  to  the  categories,  we 
may  conclude  that  no  definite  perception  can  come  to 
our  minds  which  has  not  been  previously  (in  a  logical 
sense)  worked  upon  by  the  categories  of  the  understand- 
ing. These  results  arrived  at  in  the  course  of  our  pre- 
vious inquires,  need  not  be  further  discussed  in  this  chap- 
ter but  we  shall  refer  to  them  as  already  established. 

Coming  now  to  a  consideration  of  the  problem  im- 
mediately before  us,  we  have  to  enquire  vv^hat  function 
sensation  has  in  calling  forth  the  action  of  the  catego- 
ries. In  this  enquiry  we  shall  follow  in  general  the  plan 
of  the  preceding  chapter  i.  e.  we  shall  first  seek  to 
discover  Kant's  general  attitude  to  sensation  and  the 
relation  which  the  categories  bear  to  it:  afterwards  we 
shall  consider  his  answer,  explicit  or  implied,  to  the 
more  special  questions  that  arise  in  connection  with  this 
part  of  our  study. 

While  dealing  with  space  we  tried  to  establish 
through  quotations  that  Kant  looks  upon  sensation  in 
general  as  a  chaotic  manifold,  without  form  of  any 
kind,^  and  that  one  of  the  elements  of  form  is  the  spa- 
tial quality  imparted  to  objects  by  the  nature  of  sensi- 
bility. Here  we  shall  see  further  that  space  alone  as 
the  pure  form  of  sensuous  perception  is  inadequate  to 
the  task  of  completely  unifying  experience,  and  that  the 
categories  are  employed  to  bring  about  that  result.  For 
this  purpose  we  shall  make  numerous  quotations  from 
the  "Transcendental  Deduction  of  the  Categories"  in 
both  first  and  second  editions  of  the  Critique,  and  from 
other  portions  of  this  work  and  from  the  Prolegomena 
so  far  as  these  appear  to  substantiate  or  contradict  the 
position  taken  by  Kant  in  the  '  'Transcendental  Deduc- 
tion." The  Deduction  however  will  be  regarded  as  of 
chief  importance  for  our  enquiry,  and  other  passages 
will  be  interpreted  in  the  light  of  the  standpoint  there 
adopted  rather  than  vice  versa. 

Section  II.  What  then  is  the  standpoint  of  the 
Critique  in  those  portions  that  deal  particularly  with  the 
employment  of  the  categories  in  the  formation  of  ex- 
perience? What  is  the  spirit  and  method  of  their  Tran- 
scendental Deduction?  Its  keynote  is  given  by  Kant  in 
the  following  words:     "It  is  really  a  sufficient  deduction 

1  Cf.  pp.  25  ff. 

49 


of  them  (the  categories)  and  a  justification  of  their  ob- 
jective vaHdity,  if  we  succeed  in  proving  that  by  them 
alone  an  object  can  be  thought."^  Again  Kant  says: 
"Receptivity  can  make  knowledge  possible  only  Nvhen 
joined  with  Spontaneity.  "^  The  business  of  the  senses, 
we  are  told  again  and  again,  is  to  receive  impressions 
according  as  they  are  affected  by  objects,  while  that  of 
the  understanding  is  to  think,  to  construct  an  orderly 
world  of  objects  out  of  the  raw  material  provided  in 
sensation. 

It  is  in  this  way  that  the  understanding  is  so  often 
referred  to  as  the  "law-giver  of  nature;"^  for  nature, 
according  to  Kant,  means  '  'the  coherence  of  phenom  ena 
in  their  existence  according  to  necessary  rules  or 
laws.  "^  "It  is  we,  therefore,  who  carry  into  the  phe- 
nomena which  we  call  nature  all  order  and  regularity, 
nay,  we  should  never  find  them  in  nature,  if  we  our- 
selves or  the  nature  of  our  mind  had  not  originally 
placed  them  there.  "^ 

Making  use  of  the  results  already  arrived  at  we 
may  say  that  Kant  attributes  to  the  productive  imagina- 
tion the  function  of  placing  the  law^s  (i.  e.  the  catego- 
ries) in  the  phenomena  of  nature,  and  this  a  priori 
activity  of  imagination  renders  possible  our  observation 
of  those  laws  in  experience.  To  bring  these  laws  to 
consciousness,  to  produce  knowledge  properly  so  called 
is  the  work  of  the  understanding.  The  synthesis  and 
the  laws  of  its  activity  are  in  both  cases  the  same. 
The  categories  are  the  modes  of  synthesis  just  as  they 
are  the  forms  of  analytic  judgment.  Using  the  term 
Understanding  in  its  wider  significance  to  include  both 
understanding  and  imagination,  we  may  say  that  Kant 
finds  in  understanding  the  source  of  all  the  formal  side 
of  the  phenomena  of  nature.  '  'As  possible  experience 
therefore  all  phenomena  depend  a  priori  on  the  under- 
standing and  receive  their  formal  possibility  from  it, 
just  as  ivhen  looked  upon  as  mere  perceptiotis  they  de- 
pend on  sensibility  and  become  possible  through  it  so 
far  as  their  form  is  concerned."^ 

From  such  passages  as  have  been  given  above  from 
the  first  edition  it  is  clear  that  the  spirit  of  the  deduc- 

1  Werke  III,  p.  566.     Cf.  pp.  112,  518. 

2  Ibid. 

3  e.  g.  see  Werke  III,  p.  583. 
*  Werke  III,  p.  191. 

5  Werke  III,  p.  582. 

6  Werke  III.  p.  583. 

50 


tion  of  the  categories  is  explicitly  this:  "all  the  catego- 
ries must  be  recognized  as  conditions  a  priori  of  the 
possibility  of  experience,  whether  of  perception  that  is 
found  in  it  or  of  thought."^  Not  less  explicitly  in  the 
same  direction  are  the  following  from  that  portion  of 
the  second  edition  of  the  Critique  which  deals  with  the 
same  subject: 

"The  connection  of  anything  manifold  can  never 
enter  into  us  through  the  senses,  and  cannot  be  con- 
tained, therefore,  already  in  the  pure  form  of  sensuous 
perception,  for  it  is  a  spontaneous  act  of  the  ideational 
faculty;  and,  as  in  order  to  distinguish  this  from  sensi- 
bility, we  must  call  it  understanding,  we  see  that  all 
connecting,  whether  we  are  conscious  of  it  or  not  .... 
is  an  act  of  the  understanding.  This  act  we  shall  call 
by  the  general  name  of  synthesis.  "^ 

"Connection,  however,  does  never  lie  in  the  objects 
and  can  never  be  borrowed  from  them  by  perception 
and  thus  be  taken  into  the  understanding,  but  it  is  al- 
ways an  act  of  the  understanding,  etc.  "^ 

Speaking  of  the  synthesis  of  productive  imagina- 
tion which  is  at  work  even  in  perception  Kant  says: 
"It  is  an  act  of  spontaneity,  determining,  and  not  like 
the  senses  determinable  only;"'^  and  further  "all  synthe- 
sis without  which  even  perception  would  be  impossible 
is  subject  to  the  categories."^  And  in  a  note  to  the 
section  we  are  told  that  perception  as  a  unity  "presup- 
poses a  synthesis  not  belonging  to  the  senses  and  by 
which  all  concepts  of  space  and  time  become  first  possi- 
ble, "*^  "It  follows  then  that  all  possible  perceptions, 
everything  in  fact  that  can  come  to  the  empirical  con- 
sciousness, that  is,  all  phenomena  of  nature,  must  so  far 
as  their  connection  is  concerned  be  subject  to  the  catego- 
ries;"'^ for  "as  mere  representations,  phenomena  are 
subject  to  no  law  of  connection,  except  that  which  is 
prescribed  by  the  connecting  faculty.  "^ 

We  have  given  above  a  few  of  the  very  many  pas- 
sages in  one  division  of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason, 
which  indicate  beyond  a  doubt  that  Kant  believed,  as 
he  himself  said,  that  "the  understanding  is  the  law- 

1  Werke  III.  p.  112. 

2  Werke  III.  p.  114. 

3  Werke  III,  p.  117. 

4  Werke  III,  p.  127. 

5  Werke  III,  p.  132. 

6  Ibid.,  note. 

1  Werke  III,  p.  134. 
8  Ibid. 

51 


giver  of  nature."  No  one  can  read  the  Transcendental 
Deduction  of  the  Categories  in  either  edition  of  the 
Critique  without  finding  unmistakable  evidence  that  the 
idea  there  uppermost  in  Kant's  mind  is  the  necessity  of 
some  synthesizing  activity  of  thought  which  shall  bring 
order  into  the  chaos  of  sensation;  and  that  this  synthe- 
sis must  be  at  work  even  in  perception,  else  it  could  not 
be  what  it  is.^ 

Now,  however,  we  must  examine  a  few  statements 
which  seem  to  contradict  this  central  thought  in  order 
to  see  whether  they  can  be  brought  into  harmony  with 
it,  or  failing  that  to  determine  which  view  is  funda- 
mental to  that  deduction.  Does  Kant  mean  to  teach 
that  the  categories  are  essential  to  the  very  existence 
of  the  object  as  an  object  of  consciousness,  or  are  the 
categories  only  added  extraneously  by  the  understanding 
after  the  object  has  been  fully  given  in  perception? 

The  most  important  passages  of  this  kind  to  be 
found  in  the  Critique  are  a  few  incidental  remarks  in 
the  sections  immediately  preceding  and  leading  up  to 
the  "Transcendental  Deduction."  In  the  first  of  these 
Kant  is  seeking  to  show  why  such  a  deduction  is  neces- 
sary by  contrasting  the  categories  with  the  forms  of 
sensibility.  It  was  easy  to  show,  he  claims,  how  the 
latter  refer  necessarily  to  objects,  for  we  cannot  even 
imagine  an  object  without  attributing  to  it  the  quality 
of  extension  and  giving  it  a  place  in  time.  To  picture 
an  object  means  to  spatialize  it. 

But  in  the  case  of  the  concepts  of  the  understand- 
ing the  matter  is  not  so  clear.  We  seem  to  be  able  to 
picture  an  object  or  receive  it  in  perception  without  em- 
ploying these  functions  of  thought  i.  e.  we  do  not  al- 
ways employ  them  explicitly.  This  seems  to  me  to  be 
Kant's  meaning  when  he  says  in  this  connection:  "It 
cannot  be  denied  that  phenomena  may  be  given  in  per- 
ception without  the  functions  of  the  understanding. 
For  if  we  take,  for  instance,  the  concept  of  cause, 
which  implies  a  peculiar  kind  of  synthesis,  consisting  in 
placing  according  to  a  rule  after  something  called  A 
something  totally  different  from  it,  B,  we  cannot  say 
that  it  is  a  priori  clear  why  phenomena  should  contain 
something  of  this  kind.  "^ 

The  last  sentence  of  this  quotation  throws  light  on 


1  Cf.  Werke  III,  p.  133. 

2  Werke  III.  pp.  109-110. 


52 


the  meaning-  of  the  first.  It  seems  to  be  stated  abso- 
lutely in  the  first,  that  "phenomena  can  be  given  with- 
out the  functions  of  the  understanding."  But  in  the 
second  sentence  we  see  that  all  this  means  is  that  we 
are  able  to  think  of  such  a  case:  it  is  not  dearivhy  phe- 
nomena should  conform  to  the  categories.  Now  as 
Kant  afterwards  shows  that  phenomena  must  conform 
to  the  nature  of  the  mind,  not  only  to  the  forms  of  sen- 
sibility but  to  the  categories  of  the  understanding  also, 
it  seems  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  absoluteness  of 
the  first  statement  is  only  apparent,  and  that  the  state- 
ments in  the  remaining  sentences  of  the  quotation  are 
to  be  regarded  as  conveying  Kant's  attitude  on  this 
subject. 

Following  the  above  passage,  and  in  line  with  the 
thought  expressed  in  it,  is  a  statement  of  a  hypothetical 
case:  "We  could  quite  well  imagine  that  phenomena 
might  possibly  be  such  that  the  understanding  should 
not  find  them  conforming  to  the  conditions  of  its  syn- 
thetical unity,  etc.  With  all  this,  phenomena  would  offer 
objects  to  our  perception,  because  perception  by  itself 
does  not  require  the  functions  of  thought."^ 

Here  the  closing  sentence  seems  very  explicit  in 
opposition  to  the  thought  which  we  have  found  to  dom- 
inate the  "Transcendental  Deduction"  in  both  editions. 
But  why  not  regard  this  sentence  as  a  part  of  the  hy- 
pothesis which  Kant  here  presents?  Or,  reading  it  in 
the  light  of  the  knowledge  which  we  already  have  of 
Kant's  system,  why  not  consider  thought  here  as  indi- 
cating a  conscious  activity  of  the  understanding?  In 
that  case  no  contradiction  could  be  found  between  this 
statement  and  that  other  which  says:  "All  possible 
perception  is  subject  to  the  categories. "^  For  Kant 
tells  us  more  than  once  that  perception  involves  a  syn- 
thesis of  the  imagination.  But  this  synthesis  is  uncon- 
scious; so  that  if  we  interpret  thought  in  the  way  sug- 
gested, regarding  it  as  a  clear  and  conscious  activity, 
Kant  can  say  that  perception  does  not  require  the  func- 
tions of  thought  without  in  any  way  contradicting  the 
statement  that  perception  involves  a  synthesis. 

The  synthesis  involved  in  perception  is  an  uncon- 
scious one,  carried  out  by  the  transcendental  faculty  of 
productive  imagination.  Hence  we  seem  able  to  receive 
objects  into  consciousness  without  their  conforming  to 

1  Werke  III,  p.  110. 

2  Werke  III,  p.  132.    Cf .  p.  24  above  with  ref  s. 

53 


the  categories,  since  that  conformity  has  been  brought 
about  quite  unknown  to  us.  The  conformity  is  undoubt- 
edly present  in  all  objects  that  come  before  the  mind, 
but  the  fact  that  it  has  been  brought  about  by  the  un- 
conscious synthesis  of  imagination  makes  a  deduction 
of  it  necessary  in  order  to  bring  it  clearly  before  the 
understanding. 

There  seems  to  be  no  reason  to  doubt  that  Kant  al- 
ways regarded  phenomena  as  in  all  cases  subject  to  the 
laws  of  the  mind  as  expressed  in  the  twelve  categories. 
But  in  pleading  for  the  necessity  of  a  transcendental 
deduction  of  them,  he  claims  that  their  applicability  to 
all  objects  of  experience  is  not  so  clear  as  is  the  case 
with  the  pure  form  of  sensibility  called  space.  We  can- 
not picture  an  object  without  consciously  spatializing  it, 
but  we  can  picture  or  imagine  an  object  without  con- 
sciously applying  the  concepts  of  the  understanding. 
We  are  therefore  compelled  to  show  how'^  the  latter  ap- 
ply to  all  objects  of  experience,  and  the  method  em- 
ployed by  Kant  consists  in  showing  that  '  'by  them  alone 
an  object  can  be  thought."^ 

There  must  have  been,  Kant  holds,  an  unconscious 
synthesis  according  to  the  categories  upon  all  the  rep- 
resentations that  come  before  consciousness,  for  other- 
wise it  would  be  impossible  to  find  those  rules  in  the 
phenomena  of  experience  called  nature.  This  is  Kant's 
view  throughout.^ 

There  are  a  few  similar  passages  to  the  ones  just 
quoted  in  the  same  section  of  the  Critique;  but  w^e  shall 
not  give  any  more  at  present,  since  we  venture  to  think 
that  the  interpretation  given  above  to  those  already 
quoted  would  apply  in  a  similar  way  to  the  remaining 
passages.  Besides  we  have  already  given  this  side  of 
the  argument  sufficient  space  as  compared  with  the 
quotations  that  could  be  made  for  our  own  interpreta- 
tion. It  is  characteristic  of  Kant's  arguments  through- 
out the  Critique  that  he  emphasizes  strongly  the  point 
which  he  happens  to  be  making  for  the  time  being.  In 
doing  so  many  statements  are  made  which  can  only  be 
understood  by  comparison  with  the  other  passages. 

In  the  case  of  the  points  at  present  under  discus- 
sion it  has  been  claimed  by  some,  by  Professor  Andrew 
Seth^*  for  example,  that  while  Kant's  attitude  is  at  times 

1  Werke  III.  pp.  108-110. 

2  Werke  III,  p.  566. 

3  Cf.  Werke  III,  pp.  569,  575,  578,  583  (1st  Ed.)  and  pp.  18,  134  (2nd  Ed.) 
*  Lectures  on  Scottish  Philosophy,  pp.  135-136. 

54 


explicitly  on  the  side  of  viewing  sensation  as  orderless 
and  dependent  for  all  order  upon  thought,  yet  the  pas- 
sages in  which  he  contradicts  such  a  position  are  too 
numerous  to  be  overlooked,  and  that  as  a  matter  of  fact 
Kant's  theory  of  knowledge  finds  order  in  the  sensation 
itself  to  be  an  essential  requirement  for  the  application 
of  the  categories. 

Now  while  one  should  not  overlook  any  such  pas- 
sages in  seeking  to  discover  the  fundamental  standpoint 
of  the  Critique,  yet  it  does  seem  that  they  weigh  a  little 
too  heavily  upon  the  mind  of  Professor  Seth.  He  would 
have  us  think  that  there  are  a  great  many  such  state- 
ments, far  surpassing  in  frequency  and  importance 
those  which,  on  his  own  confession,  indicate  explicitly 
the  opposing  point  of  view.  As  opposed  to  this,  how- 
ever, we  may  urge  the  fact  that,  if  we  exclude  the 
Aesthetic  which  all  admit  to  be  provisional  in  its  state- 
ments, comparatively  few  passages  in  either  edition  of 
the  Critique  can  be  cited  which  even  apparently  favour 
Professor  Seth's  interpretation.  On  the  contrary, 
throughout  the  whole  Analytic,  Kant  but  rings  the 
changes  on  this  one  idea,  viz.,  sensations  as  such  being 
formless  and  orderless,  the  world  of  our  representations, 
the  phenomenal  world,  could  not  be  what  it  is  but  for 
the  synthesizing  power  of  imagination  or  the  uncon- 
scious activity  of  the  understanding. 

It  must  of  course  be  admitted  that  there  is  a  certain 
plausibility  in  the  opposite  interpretation,  not  so  much, 
we  think,  because  of  the  number  or  explicitness  of  the 
passages  that  favour  it,  but  because  of  Kant's  funda- 
mental distinction  between  Sensibility  and  Understand- 
ing, That  distinction  Kant  makes  absolute.  '  'The  un- 
derstanding cannot  see,  the  senses  cannot  think.  "^  Sen- 
sibility can  only  receive  impressions,  the  understanding 
can  only  produce  knowledge  out  of  what  is  provided  for 
it  in  Sensibility. 

But  by  the  introduction  of  a  third  faculty,  the  im- 
agination, they  are  brought  together.  ^  By  this  means 
that  distinction  in  its  absoluteness  is  broken  down,  the 
more  surely  if  our  view  is  correct  which  interprets  im- 
agination as  the  unconscious  aspect  of  understanding. 
And  because  of  the  fundamental  and  very  significant 
functions  attributed  to  the  imagination,  there  seems  to 
be  no  valid  reason  for  insisting  upon  the  absoluteness 


1  Werke  IH,  p.  82.    Cf .  pp.  231,  234. 

2  Werke  III,  p.  582. 


55 


of  the  distinction  mentioned  as  any  positive  argument 
in  favour  of  one  interpretation  rather  than  another,  so 
far  as  concerns  the  question  under  discussion.  ^ 

So  far  as  the  "Transcendental  Deduction"  goes, 
even  Dr.  J.  H.  Stirling,  who  perhaps  may  be  regarded 
as  the  greatest  exponent  of  the  interpretation  of  Kant 
given  by  Professor  Seth,  freely  admits  that  no  trace  of 
this  view  is  to  found.  While  advocating  strongly  his 
views  Dr.  Stirling  does  not  pretend  to  find  any  consider- 
able evidence  for  them  in  the  Critique  itself.  He  relies 
almost  solely  upon  the  Prolegomena.  "Our  assump- 
tion," he  says  in  an  article  in  Mind, ^  "involves  also  this, 
that  Kant  till  then  (i.  e.  till  writing  the  Prolegomena), 
had  never  thought  of  order  in  the  materials  of  sense; 
but  that  it  had  suddenly  struck  him  theyi. ' '  '  'The  prob- 
able conclusion  is  that  throughout  the  whole  of  the  first 
edition,  Kant  had  no  intention  but  to  give  it  to  be 
understood  that  all  law,  all  rule,  came  into  sense  by  the 
categories  alone.  ^ 

In  the  Prolegomena,  however.  Dr.  Stirling  finds 
abundant  evidence  for  his  view  in  the  distinction  be- 
tween judgments  of  understanding  and  judgrnents  of 
perception.  To  speak  of  a  judgment  of  perception  is  to 
his  mind  the  same  as  to  attribute  a  certain  order  to  the 
impressions  themselves.  "But  it  is  quite  certain  that 
it  is  only  in  the  Prolegomena,  in  what  concerns  the 
judgment  of  perception,  namely,  that  we  have  exphcit 
notice  of  this  order  on  the  part  of  Kant.""*  Nor  does 
the  second  edition  of  the  Critique  furnish  him  with  any- 
thing that  agrees  with  the  passages  which  he  makes 
use  of  from  the  Prolegomena.  For  this  omission  on 
Kant's  part.  Dr.  Stirling  suggests  the  following  expla- 
nation: "Kant  would  seem  to  have  thought  in  the  end 
that  it  would  be  just  as  well  to  say  the  least  possible  in 
the  Critique  about  the  distinction  between  the  two  judg- 
ments: there  was  still  plenty  of  matter  in  the  book 
with  which  it  would  seem  not  well  to  cohere!"^ 

Such  is  Dr.  Stirling's  defence  for  confining  his  quo- 
tations to  the  Prolegomena  in  order  to  substantiate  his 
interpretation  of  Kant.     However  satisfactory  it  may 


1  In  this  connection  the  remark  of  Kant  that  "the  two  faculties  Sense  and 
Understanding  may  perhaps  spring  from  the  same  root"  is  worthy  of  mention. 
Werke  III,  p.  52. 

2  Mind  Vol.  10.  p.  62. 

3  Mind  Vol.  10,  p.  61. 

4  Ibid. 

5  Mind  Vol.  10,  p.  62. 


56 


be  to  himself  or  some  others,  we  do  not  propose  to  ac- 
cept forthwith,  in  this  essay,  a  view  which  can  only  be 
defended  by  such  a  reflection  upon  the  honesty  of  the 
author  whom  we  are  seeking  to  interpret.  It  would,  too, 
be  strange  indeed  if  Kant's  true  views  were  to  be  found 
in  the  Prolegomena  alone,  and  the  whole  of  his  greatest 
work,  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  were  written  from  a 
standpoint  so  fundamentally  different  from  his  only  real 
theory  of  knowledge.  It  will  be  our  task  soon  to  inquire 
how  far  the  standpoint  of  the  Prolegomena  really  differs 
from  that  of  the  Critique.  But  just  now  we  wish  to  say 
that  if  the  former  is  found  to  be  totally  different  from 
the  latter,  we  shall  not  hesitate  to  regard  the  Critique 
as  representing  the  real  theory  which  Kant  had  in 
mind  to  establish.  We  have  quoted  from  Dr.  Stirling 
simply  to  show  that  the  greatest  advocate  of  that  inter- 
pretation of  Kant  which  finds,  on  his  principles,  order 
in  the  impressions  of  sense,  is  compelled  to  admit  that 
in  Kant's  chief  work  the  evidence  is  overhelmingly  on 
the  other  side. 

In  advocating  a  view  opposed  to  Dr.  Stirling's,  we 
have  so  far  confined  ourselves  to  quotations  from  the 
"Transcendental  Deduction  of  the  Categories."  But 
before  leaving  the  Critique  to  examine  some  passages  in 
the  Prolegomena,  we  wish  to  point  out  some  statements 
of  Kant  which  indicate  his  own  view  of  his  arguments 
in  the  Deduction  of  the  Categories.  These  will  be  found 
in  that  part  of  the  Dialectic  which  deals  v/ith  the 
"Method  of  TranscendentaHsm. " 

In  explaining  this  Kant  frequently  takes  the  prin- 
ciple of  Causality  as  an  example  and  reminds  his  read- 
ers of  his  own,  which,  he  thinks,  is  the  only  method  pi 
proof.  '  It  has  this  peculiarity  that  it  first  renders  its 
own  proof,  namely,  experience  possible,  and  has  always 
to  be  presupposed  for  the  sake  of  experience."^  "What  our 
proof  really  shows  is,  that  experience  itself  and  there- 
fore the  object  of  experience  would  be  impossible  with- 
out such  a  (causal)  connection.  "^ 

Again  in  speaking  of  the  peculiarity  of  trancenden- 
tal  proofs,  viz. ,  that  only  one  proof  can  be  given  for  a 
transcendental  proposition,  he  cites  the  proof  of  causal- 
ity as  an  instance  of  this  general  law: 

"In  the  Trancendental  Analytic,  for  instance,  we 


1  Werke  III,  p.  492. 

2  Werke  III,  p.  518. 


57 


had  deduced  the  principle  that  everything  which  happens 
has  a  cause  from  the  si7igle  condition  of  the  objective 
possibility  of  the  concept  of  an  event  in  general,  name- 
ly, that  the  determination  of  any  event  in  time,  and 
therefore  of  this  event  also,  as  belonging  to  experience 
would  be  impossible  unless  it  were  subject  to  such  a 
dynamical  rule.  This  is  therefore  the  only  possible 
proof,  etc.  "^ 

From  such  passages  as  the  above  we  see  in  what 
way  Kant  himself  looked  upon  the  method  of  his  dis- 
cussions in  the  earlier  portions  of  the  Critique.  All  or 
any  of  the  transcendental  principles  can  be  proved  only 
by  showing  that  they  render  experience  possible.  Such 
a  proof  could  have  no  validity,  and  would  not  be  at  all 
necessary,  if  sensations  themselves  had  that  order  which 
is  found  in  experience.  It  is  simply  because  Kant  looks 
upon  the  materials  of  sense  as  without  law  or  order  in 
themselves,  that  be  judges  the  activity  of  the_  catego- 
ries to  be  necessary  in  the  formation  of  experience  as 
we  have  it. 

^  Section  III.  —Let  us  now  turn  to  Kant's  treatment 
of  the  Categories  in  the  Prolegomena.-  The  deduction 
here  given  is  manifestly  different,  on  the  surface  at 
least,  from  the  one  which  we  have  considered  in  the 
Critique.  This  is  seen  at  once  in  the  statement  of  the 
problem,  i.  e.  in  the  method  by  which  the  categories 
are  to  be  deduced.  "How  is  pure  Natural  Science  pos- 
sible?"^ asks  Kant  in  the  opening  section  to  the  deduc- 
tion of  the  Prolegomena;  while,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
question  asked  in  the  Critique  is:  "How  is  experience 
possible?"  And  although  Kant  says  later  on  in  the 
Prolegomena"*  that  the  two  questions  are  practically  the 
same,  yet  I  think  we  shall  see  that  this  difference  in 
statement  does,  to  some  extent,  determine  the  differ- 
ence in  the  method  of  treatment. 

Knowledge  in  the  form  of  a  Natural  Science  must 
be  made  up  of  clearly  formulated  laws,  explicitly  appli- 
cable to  the  data  in  hand.  Experience,  on  the  other 
hand,  may  or  may  not  consist  of  laws  so  clearly  defined 
in  consciousness.  Thus  we  might  distinguish  ordinary 
and  scientific  experience,  and  the  distinction  would  be 
very  much  the  same  as  Kant  makes  in  the  Prolegomena 


1  Werke  III.  p.  521. 

2  Werke  IV,  pp.  43-54. 

3  Werke  IV.  p.  43.  Cf.  also  pp.  26,  27. 

4  Werke  IV,  p.  45. 

58 


between  judgmeyits  of  perception  and  judgments  of  ex- 
perience.'^    The  latter  only  belong  to  Science. 

Now  while  in  the  Critique  no  sharp  line  of  distinc- 
tion was  drawn,  still  less  preserved,  between  these  two 
kinds  of  experience,  we  have  seen  that  a  large  part  of 
the  "Transcendental  Deduction"  was  concerned  to  in- 
vestigate the  unconscious  contribution  of  the  mind  to 
experience  through  the  synthesis  of  imagination.  In 
those  sections  of  the  deduction  it  might  have  been  said 
that  Kant's  question  was:  "How  is  ordinary  experi- 
ence, that  of  the  ordinary  man,  possible?"  It  is  possi- 
ble, he  would  answer,  because  the  faculty  of  productive 
imagination  is  ever  at  work  in  weaving  experience  out 
of  the  raw  material  provided  in  sense.  Sensation  alone 
could  not  give  us  experience,  but  all  unknown  to  us 
there  is  a  continued  activity  of  imagination  which,  by 
directing  its  a  priori  synthesis  to  the  impressions  of 
sense,  gives  us  experience  as  we  have  it.  But  because 
this  synthesis  is  a  jwiori  and  unconscious,  we  are  easily 
led  to  believe  that  the  order  present  in  experience  is 
due  to  the  sensations  themselves.  In  reality,  however, 
we  could  not  even  have  perceptions  of  objects  but  for 
this  function  of  the  imagination. 

The  understanding,  however,  is  still  needed  in  or- 
der to  complete  the  work  done  by  imagination  i.  e.  to 
reduce  this  unconscious  synthesis  to  concepts  and  thus 
bring  about  knowledge  properly  so  called.  This,  I 
should  think,  Kant  might  very  well  have  called  scien- 
tific experience  or  scientific  knowledge,  as  distinct  from 
ordinary  experience  which  is  the  result  of  imaginative 
synthesis.  And  these  two  kinds  of  experience,  im- 
plicitly present  in  the  Critique,  seem  to  correspond  to 
the  two  kinds  of  judgment  in  the  Prolegomena.  The 
experience  of  the  ordinary  man  consists  of  judgments  of 
perception.  The  judgments  of  experience,  on  the  other 
hand,  make  up  the  sum  total  of  natural  science.  The 
latter  only  carry  with  them  a  conscious  necessity.  Such 
judgments  of  experience,  Kant  claims,  can  only  arise 
through  addition  to  those  of  perception  of  a  contribu- 
tion from  the  understanding.  For  without  this  activity 
on  the  part  of  the  understanding  we  could  only  say 
that  an  event,  for  instance,  so  happens,  not  that  it  must 
so    happen. 2     In    the    judgments    of    perception,    no 


1  Werke  IV,  p.  47. 

s  Werke  IV.  pp.  49,  50  note. 


59 


thought  is  present  as  to  what  other  persons  would  think 
of  such  judgments,  but  when  one  has  arrived  at  a  judg- 
ment of  experience,  one  feels  that  every  person  must 
agree  with  it,  that  it  is  necessarily  and  universally 
valid.  1 

This  difference  in  the  aim  and  method  of  the 
Prolegomena  as  compared  with  the  Critique  being 
clearly  before  us,  we  are  prepared  to  expect  statements 
in  the  deductions  of  the  one  that  differ  considerably 
from  those  of  the  other,  and  such  differences  are  to  be 
found.  Here  is  an  instance  from  the  Prolegomena  of 
Kant's  distinction  between  the  two  kinds  of  judgment 
already  referred  to: 

'  That  the  room  is  warm,  the  sugar  sweet,  etc. ,  are 
merely  subjectively  valid  judgments.  I  do  not  expect 
that  I  shall  always  or  that  every  other  person  will  find 
them  as  I  do  now.  They  only  express  a  reference  of 
two  sensations  to  the  same  subject,  namely,  myself, 
and  that  only  in  my  present  state  of  perception,  and 
are  not  therefore  valid  of  objects.  I  call  these  judg- 
ments of  perception.  With  judgments  of  experience 
the  case  is  altogether  different.  What  experience 
teaches  me  under  certain  circumstances,  it  must  teach 
me  at  all  times  and  every  other  person  as  well;  its  va- 
lidity is  not  limited  to  the  subject  or  to  the  state  of  the 

latter  at  a  particular  time I  insist,  that  is,  that  I 

at  all  times  and  every  other  person  shall  necessarily  so 
combine  the  same  perceptions  under  the  same  circum- 
stances. '  '2  Kant  goes  on  to  argue  that  it  is  only  by  means 
of  the  categories  of  the  understanding  that  the  subjective 
judgments  spoken  of  above  can  be  transformed  into  ob- 
jective judgments.  "When  through  the  conception  of 
the  understanding  the  connection  of  the  presentations 
given  to  our  sensibility  through  the  latter  is  determined 
as  universally  valid,  the  object  is  determined  by  this 
relation  and  the  judgment  is  objective."^ 

Now  while  in  its  statement  the  Prolegomena  dif- 
fers, in  the  passages  quoted,  from  the  statement  of  the 
Critique,  the  difference  between  the  two  does  not  seem 
to  be  so  serious  as  the  letter  of  the  text  would  indicate. 
We  have  already  seen  that,  on  the  principles  of  the 
Critique,  a  distinction  is  possible  between  ordinary  and 
scientific  knowledge  which  would  correspond  to  subjec- 

1  Werke  IV,  pp.  47  ff. 
=  Werke  IV,  p.  48. 
3  Werke  IV,  p.  48. 

60 


tive  and  objective  judgments  respectively,  interpreting 
objective  to  mean  necessarily  and  universally  valid, 
valid  for  all  times  and  all  places.^  Nor  need  the  state- 
ment that  all  our  judgments  are  at  first  judgments  of 
perception^  be  regarded  as  alien  to  the  spirit  of  the 
Critique,  on  our  interpretation  of  the  distinction  be- 
tween these  two  kinds  of  judgment.  For  Kant  never 
seeks  to  deny,  but  on  the  contrary  strongly  affirms,  that 
we  come  to  clearer  consciousness  of  the  laws  implied  in 
experience  by  reflexion  upon  experience,  that  only  in 
that  way  can  we  have  true  knowledge.  ^ 

But  what  makes  the  Prolegomena  so  hard  to  recon- 
cile with  our  interpretation  of  the  Critique  is  his  appar- 
ent attributing  of  order,  and  regular  order  too,  to  the 
impressions  of  sense.  Here  is  the  passage  of  which  Dr. 
Stirling  makes  so  much  when  discussing  Kant's  attitude 
on  the  question  of  Causality:  "It  is  possible  that  in  the 
perception  a  rule  of  relation  may  be  met  with  which  says 
that  on  the  occurence  of  a  given  phenomenon  another 
always  follows  (though  not  conversely)  .  .  .  . ,  but 
there  is  no  necessity  of  connection  here,  in  other  words 
no  conception  of  a  cause.  "^  In  order  to  its  necessity 
the  concept  of  cause  of  still  needed  etc.  etc. 

In  criticizing  this  passage  Stirling  says  that  Kant 
has  not  a  word  to  tell  us  about  the  whence  of  this  order 
in  the  perceptions,  and  interprets  it  to  mean  that  sensa- 
tion as  such  must  have  that  order  in  itself.  ^  Now  while 
Kant  does  not  in  the  Prolegomena  tell  us  how  the  order 
comes  about  in  perceptions,  he  certainly  has  already 
told  us  that  in  the  Critique.  It  comes  from  the  synthe- 
sis of  imagination  which  has  been  at  work  unconsciously 
in  constructing  and  bringing  before  consciousness  the 
perceptions  themselves.  If  then  we  read  the  Proleg- 
omena in  the  light  of  the  Critique  rather  than  vice 
versa,  I  see  no  reason  why  his  statement  in  the  above 
passages  need  be  regarded  as  conflicting  with  the  view 
we  have  taken  of  Kant's  position  in  the  Critique.  By 
calling  both  judgments  he  seems  to  indicate  that  there 
is  more  involved  than  mere  sensation  in  the  subjective 
state  of  mind  described.  In  Section  20  of  the  Proleg- 
omena he  tells  us  explicitly  that   "judgment  pertains 


1  Cf.  Werke  IV,  p.  47. 

2  Werke  IV,  p.  47. 

3  Cf.  Werke  III,  pp.  99,  107-108. 
*  Werke  IV  p.  60. 

5  Mind  Vol.  X.  pp.  58  ff. 

61 


K 


solely  to  the  understanding,"^  and  then  proceeds  to  dis- 
tinguish the  two  kinds  of  judgment  as  given  above. 
Accordingly,  the  Deduction  of  the  Categories  as  given 
in  the  Prolegomena  does  not  seem  to  us  necessarily  in 
conflict  with  what  Dr.  Stirling  himself  admits  to  be  the 
spirit  of  that  given  in  the  Critique. 

Section  IV.  There  is  one  difficulty  raised  by  Dr. 
Stirling  that  has  not  yet  been  touched  upon,  viz. ,  how 
comes  it  that  one  category  is  employed  at  one  time  and 
another  at  another?  Evidently,  says  Dr.  Stirling,  there 
is  need  of  a  cue  in  sense,  there  must  be  something  in 
the  sensation  which  calls  forth  the  appropriate  category. 
Now  it  seems  to  me  that  before  such  a  criticism  is  in 
order,  it  will  be  necessary  to  show  that  the  various  cat- 
egories are  employed  separately,  a  task  for  which  I 
think  even  Dr.  Stirling  would  prove  incompetent. 
Throughout  the  whole  of  the  Deduction  of  the  Catego- 
ries we  have  seen  that  the  argument  was:  these  twelve 
categories  are  necessary  to  the  construction  of  an 
object  of  experience.  No  hint  was  given  that  any  one 
of  them  was  sufficient  of  itself  to  form  an  object  out  of 
the  manifold  of  sense.  Of  course  in  his  treatment  and 
proof  of  these  principles,  each  one  is  treated  separately; 
and  this  is  to  be  expected,  since  each  one  is  constitutive 
of  a  different  aspect  of  objectivity.  But  this  is  no  rea- 
son for  supposing  that  they  do  not  all  act  upon  the  same 
sensuous  materials. 

Such  a  thought  is  not  altogether  foreign  to  Dr. 
Stirling  himself.  In  an  article  in  the  Journal  of  Specu- 
lative Philosophy,  he  attacks  Schopenhauer  and  Caird 
for  teaching,  as  he  interprets  them,  that  the  category 
of  causality  alone  is  constitutive  of  objectivity  on  Kant's 
principles,  and  adds:  "It  is  a  glaring  error,  it  is  even 
a  terrible  error,  the  most  terrible  error  possible  in  a 
student  of  Kant,  to  say  that  Kant  held  causality  to  be 
singly  and  alone  the  category  of  objectivity."-  Again 
he  says,  '  'all  the  categories  are  there  for  no  other  pur- 
pose than  to  infuse  necessity  into  the  contingency  of 
sense;  and  Kant  would  have  been  astounded  by  his 
reader  lifting  his  face  to  say:  so  all  objectivity  is  given 
by  causality  alone!  Lieber  Gott!  he  would  have  thought 
to  himself,  what  is  quantity  there  for,  or  quality  there 
for,  or  substance  there  for?    Is  not  every  one  of  them 


1  Werke  IV  p.  49. 

2  Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy,  Vol.  14,  p.  59. 

62 


wholly  and  solely  there  for  no  other  purpose  than  to 
produce  objectivity?"^ 

Now  though  these  stirring  remarks  of  Dr.  Stirling 
are  made  in  a  somewhat  different  connection,  I  think 
they  may  be  turned  against  his  own  interpretation  of 
Kant;  for  in  that  very  part  of  the  Prolegomena  with 
which  we  have  been  dealing,  Kant's  effort  has  been  di- 
rected to  an  explanation  of  the  meaning  of  objectivity. 
We  simply  need  to  quote  Dr.  Stirling  against  himself  in 
order  to  show  that  all  the  categories  are  needed  for  the 
construction  of  the  object,  and  that  there  is  no  question 
as  to  the  category  of  quantity  now,  and  the  category  of 
causality  then.^ 

On  the  whole,  then,  our  conclusion  is  that  Kant  re- 
mains true  in  spirit  throughout  to  his  conception  of 
sense  as  a  chaotic  manifold;  not  only  so  far  as  spatial 
attributes  of  objects  are  concerned  but  also  with  refer- 
ence to  the  causal  and  other  relations  of  objects  to  one 
another,  sensations  are  entirely  dependent  for  their  form 
upon  the  contribution  from  the  synthetic  activity  of 
mind.  The  only  contribution  to  knowledge  from  the 
'thing  in  itself  is  the  raw  material  of  sensation,  which 
is  without  form  and  orderless. 


1  Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy,  Vol.  13,  p.  12. 

2  Cf.  Adamson,  Phil,  of  Kant,  p.  212,  note. 

63 


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